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The role of universities in supporting economic development has been explored 
in numerous studies emphasizing the mechanisms of technology transfer and knowl-
edge spillover. However, in addition to these forms of intellectual capital, university 
scientists bring other resources into research collaboration and contribute to firm part-
nerships in both direct and indirect ways. This thesis proposes the concept of resource 
spillover, which captures the various ways in which university scientists can benefit col-
laborating firms. The study first analyzes firms, university scientists, and collaboration 
along with the concepts of ego, alter, and network ties in social capital theory; then it 
categorizes the resources possessed by university scientists into human capital, social 
capital, and positional capital, and tests the impact of each on the performance of a firm.  
The study finds that firms benefit from research collaboration in terms of both increased 
research capability and research output and improved public relations and research 
credibility. 
The study is carried out using a sample of new nanotechnology-based firms in 
the United States.  As the U.S. government recognizes nanotechnology as providing 
scientific and technological opportunities with immense potential, this industry has be-
come the recipient of significant federal R&D funding.  In turn, because academic re-
search has proven to be important to not only overall nanotechnology R&D but also in-
dustrial R&D, it necessitates appropriate policy programs that support successful re-
source spillover from academia and promote the development of industry. 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 University-industry relationship 
The history of the university-industry relationship in the United States can be di-
vided into three periods:  from the mid-1800s to WWII; from the early 1940s to the mid-
1970s; and from the late 1970s to the present (Abramson, Encarnacao et al. 1997). Dur-
ing the first period, university research was more immediately practical and applied, and 
tailored to support the technical needs of local or regional industries, in particular the ag-
riculture industry. About 40 percent of federal research funds went to university-based 
agriculture research in the mid-1930s.   
After the Second World War, the reputation of academic research in meeting na-
tional goals was greatly enhanced because it served the war effort. Federal agencies be-
came the major source of research funding, and the orientation of university research 
shifted to more basic or long-term applied research. The difference between academic 
research and industrial research was reinforced during this period, with one labeled “ba-
sic research” and the other “applied research.” (Ibid) 
The current phase is characterized by a renewed interest in collaborative research 
between academia and industry.  The emergence of technology-intensive industries, such 
as information technology, biotechnology, and micro-electronics, has generated a surge 
in interest in academic research. Increased R&D costs have also compelled universities to 
seek not only federal but also private funding. (Ibid) Therefore, according to Gibbons et 
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al. (1994), university research transited from Mode 1: traditional researcher-initiated and 
interest driven research, to Mode 2: context focused and problem driven research. The 
social structure of this era is also represented by the concept of the triple helix, given the 
close linkages among the government, universities, and industry (Etzkowitz and Leydes-
dorff 2000). 
University-industry interactions were also fostered by a series of federal technol-
ogy transfer legislatives authorized in the 1980s (Table 1.1). The most notable legislation 
were the 1980 Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Act and a 1984 amendment to this act 
that allowed universities to own the patents of their inventions that resulted from feder-
ally-funded research and license them to industry. This legislation created financial in-
centives for universities to market technologies and to encourage them to actively engage 
in technology transfer (Cooke and Morgan 1998).  However, Mowery et al. (2001) cau-
tioned that the Bayh-Dole act might not be as effective as it seems since it doesn’t sig-
nificantly change university patent portfolios and research content. 
 
Table 1.1   Selected federal technology transfer legislation since 1980 
Year  Name  Key Points  
1980  Stevenson-Wydler Technol-
ogy Innovation Act  
Made technology transfer a mission of the federal gov-
ernment and established the Office of Research, Tech-
nology and Applications (ORTAs)  
1980  Bayh-Dole Patent and Trade-
mark Act  
Allowed universities, not-for-profit organizations, and 
small businesses to retain certain rights related to in-
ventions they developed under funding agreements 
with the government  
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Table 1.1   continued 
1982 Small Business Innovation 
Development Act 
Required federal agencies to provide special set aside 
funds for small business R&D 
1984  Amendment to Bayh-Dole 
Patent and Trademark Act 
Deleted term limitations on exclusive licenses and des-
ignated the Secretary of Commerce to determine "ex-
ceptional circumstances" when contractor rights might 
be overruled  
1984  National Cooperative Re-
search Act  
Encouraged joint R&D ventures among competing pri-
vate firms to enhance U.S. industrial competitiveness 
by allowing an exemption from treble damages in pri-
vate antitrust legislation for registered ventures  
1986  Federal Technology Transfer 
Act  
Amended the Stevenson-Wydler Act to authorize the 
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 
(CRADA) for government-owned, government-
operated laboratories (GOGOs) and formed the Federal 
Laboratory Consortium (FLC) for Technology Transfer 
1988  Executive Order 12591 and 
1218 
Required federal agencies to delegate authority to gov-
ernment-operated laboratories to enter into cooperative 
agreements; provided the authority to enhance the 
global trade position of the U.S.  
1988  Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act  
Established regional university-based Manufacturing 
Technology Centers for the transfer of advanced manu-
facturing techniques to small & medium-size firms  
1989  National Competitiveness 
Technology Transfer Act 
(NCTTA)  
Amended the Stevenson-Wydler Act to establish tech-
nology transfer as a federal laboratory mission and 
permit CRADAs for government-owned, contractor-
operated laboratories (GOCOs)  
1991  American Technology Pre-
eminence Act  
Extended the FLC mandate through 1996, allowed the 
exchange of intellectual property between participants 
in a CRADA, and allowed laboratory directors to gift 
excess equipment to not-for-profit organizations   
1992  Small Business Technology 
Transfer Act  
Established the Small Business Technology Transfer 
Research (STTR) Program  
Source: (NTTC 1996; Bozeman 2000) 
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 Currently, higher education and university research are regarded as the essential 
driver of high technology-based economic development and an essential aspect of the in-
novation system (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993; Siegel, Waldman et al. 2003; Rosenbloom 
2004). After all, technological development is more likely to take place in universities 
instead of in companies, as universities are more likely to pursue scientific knowledge 
independent of commercial applications, and pure science is more effective at stimulating 
advanced innovations than applied research (Kaufmann and Todtling 2001). Mansfield 
(1991) found that about one-tenth of the new products and processes commercialized be-
tween 1975 and 1985 in some high tech industries would not have been developed with-
out the support of university research.  In general, innovative or learning regions contain 
both top universities and firms that have access to their knowledge (Cooke, Uranga et al. 
1997). Regions such as San Jose (CA), Boston (MA), Raleigh-Durham (NC), and Austin 
(TX) are well known for their strategies of using universities to attract high tech indus-
tries. 
Universities and industry cooperate in various modes: from informal information 
transfer such as consulting, training, and undirected cooperate gifts to more structured 
cooperation such as contract research, research consortia, business incubators, and re-
search centers (Geisler 1995). See Table 1.2 for the variety of university-firm links.  
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Table 1.2   University-firm links  
 Types of university-firm links 
1 Ad hoc or regular consultations among firm employees at universities 
2 Presentations by faculty members at firms, or by firm employees at universities 
3 Discussions between faculty members and firm employees at professional association 
meetings, conferences, and seminars 
4 Purchases of university research results (patents) on an ad hoc basis 
5 Training of firm employees by university researchers 
6 Joint supervision of Ph.D. and master’s theses by university and firm members 
7 Access to special equipment of a firm/university with or without the assistance of the 
owner’s organizations 
8 Investment in university facilities 
9 Regular acquisition of university research 
10 Joint publications by university researchers and firm employees 
11 Formal R&D cooperation such as contract research or joint research projects 
12 Creation of business incubators and research centers 
13 Permanent or temporary mobility from universities to firms 
14 Spin-off formations of new enterprises 
Source: (Inzelt 2004) 
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Several factors stimulate university cooperation with industry:  the commerciali-
zation of technology, the seeking of research funding, the exposure of faculty and stu-
dents to practical questions and intellectually challenging research programs, and access 
to firm technologies (Geisler, Furino et al. 1991; Etzkowitz, Webster et al. 1998). The 
collaboration between U.S. researchers from academia and those from other sectors is 
one of the indicators of the usefulness of academic research (NSB 2004). On the other 
hand, the motivation for firms to cooperate with academicians include having access to 
knowledgeable researchers and well-educated graduates, university facilities, state-of-
the-art information and knowledge, assistance with education and training and outsourc-
ing R&D activities; obtaining solutions to technical problems; and gaining prestige and 
enhancing their image (Evan and Olk 1990; Geisler 1995; Allan 2001; Geisler 2001). The 
government can also benefit from university-industry interaction by correcting any mar-
ket failure in R&D investment, speeding up technological innovation, and increasing 
technological information exchange among various sectors (Hagedoorn, Link et al. 2000). 
 
1.2 University-industry technology transfer 
Technology and technical change is one of the main driving forces behind the 
structure of production, opportunities for trade, increases in international competitiveness, 
and growth of the national income (Dahlman and Nelson 1995). Accounting for a sub-
stantial share of worker productivity growth (Solow 1957; Denison 1962), it is regarded 
as a key driver of economic growth (Schumpeter 1911). As the key problem of technol-
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ogy policy is not so much in generating new ideas but more in ensuring that the ideas are 
effectively used (Ergas 1987), the emphasis has shifted from building research capabili-
ties to promoting technology transfer with the intention of generating more spin-offs from 
public R&D and more fully exploiting commercialization opportunities (Shapira 2001). 
More than 200 universities in the United States were involved in technology transfer-
related activities by 1990 (Jamison and Jansen 2000). In 1999, the commercialization of 
university research generated more than $40 billion in revenue and supported over 
270,000 jobs (AUTM 2003). 
Technology transfer refers to the movement of technology and know-how from 
one organization to another. However, the acquisition of the know-how accompanying 
hard technology is not only more important but also more difficult in the technology 
transfer process (Audretsch, Bozeman et al. 2002).  Although extensive literature on the 
topic of technology transfer is available, the majority focuses on international technology 
transfer before 1980, when the research agenda shifted to domestic technology transfer 
(Bozeman 2000). Technology-related interactions occur between organizations across 
institutional boundaries at different levels, such as governmental agencies, universities, 
federal labs, and firms. Technology transfer occurs in the form of 1) embodied technol-
ogy flows: through the purchase of products and intermediate goods; 2) technical interac-
tions: through patenting, citations of patents and scientific publications in other sectors, 
and joint research activities; and 3) personnel mobility: through flows of skilled workers 
(OECD 1997). The latter two forms are more common in university-industry relation-
ships, as firms are attracted by the scientific knowledge and human resources that univer-
sities generate.  
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1.3 Purpose and structure of thesis 
In addition to benefiting from knowledge and technology transfer, always the 
main theme in university-industry literature, high tech firms can profit from collaboration 
with university scientists in other aspects as well.  For example, firms can gain the trust 
of university scientists, building a strong base for other activities; they can also become 
more embedded into scientific community, which opens even more opportunities for ac-
quiring high quality knowledge; and finally, they can enhance their social credentials 
through links with prestigious universities. Evidence of these benefits can be found in 
social capital theory. This thesis attempts to explore these various resources inherent in 
academia and track the spillover effects of interactions with university scientists on high 
tech firms. The term "resource spillover" is used in this thesis to indicate the resources 
diffused from university to industry through collaboration. The core research question in 
this thesis is as follows: 
How do new technology-based small firms benefit from resources spillovers asso-
ciated with university scientist collaborations? 
By identifying the resources of university scientists that have potential benefits to 
high tech firms and clarifying how these benefits affect firm performance, this study pro-
vides a reference point from which policy scientists can begin to design appropriate pro-
grams that assure successful resource spillover and promote high tech industry develop-
ment. 
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Due to its knowledge-intensive nature and close connection with academia, the 
nanotechnology industry is used as a case study in this thesis, the structure of which is 
organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the development of nanotechnology and the 
nanotechnology industry, and Chapter 3 describes its involvement in research activities 
and interactions with university. Chapter 4 reviews social capital theory, which this thesis 
proposes as a way of explaining firm-university collaborative behavior, including its ori-
gins and applications, and then introduces a research framework and applies concepts of 
social capital theory to explain resource spillover that results from university-firm inter-
actions. Chapter 5 explains the methodology used in this study, including data collection 
and variable construction, and Chapter 6 discusses the model specifications and econo-
metric results. Chapter 7 presents the conclusions, policy implications, and limitations of 
the study.  
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CHAPTER 2: NANOTECHNOLOGY AND THE NANOTECHNOL-
OGY INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
This chapter briefly defines the nature of nanotechnology and debates surrounding 
it and then reviews the history of nanotechnology and significant breakthroughs in in-
strumentation that have led to its industrialization. The chapter ends by discussing the 
commercialization of nanotechnology and the development of the nanotechnology indus-
try. 
 
2.1 Nanotechnology and its applications 
Associated with nanotechnology, at the leading-edge of knowledge, are state-of-
the-art techniques, revolutionary technology opportunities, and a promise of successful 
economic development. A wide range of disciplines such as physics, chemistry, biology, 
materials, mathematics, and engineering have contributed to developments in nanotech-
nology (NSTC 1999). Due to the diversity of these fields, no existing definition captures 
the full range of its applications. The National Nanotechnology Initiatives (NNI)’s ver-
sion of the definition (PCAST 2005) of nanotechnology is the “science, engineering, and 
technology related to the understanding and control of matter at the length scale of ap-
proximately 1 to 100 nanometers.”  The essence of nanotechnology is that it allows one 
to work at the nanometer level to generate larger structures with novel and significantly 
improved properties and functions. Currently known nanostructures include carbon nano-
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tubes, proteins, DNA, and single-electron transistors operating at room temperature 
(NSTC 1999).  
Since the 1990s, numerous applications of nanotechnology have emerged in the 
market. Three organizations have played an important role in assisting firms with trans-
lating underlying research into valuable products:  the US NanoBusiness Alliance, the 
Europe Nanobusiness Association, and the Asia-Pacific Nanotechnology Forum. Firms 
that lead in incorporating nanotechnologies into products already being used by consum-
ers are the paints and cosmetics (e.g., shampoos, skin creams, and sunscreens) industries 
(Wood , Jones et al. 2003).  Other commercial applications of nanotechnology already in 
use include hard-disks for computers and improvements to telecommunications (Ibid).  
Table 2.1 lists the top ten nanotech products in 2003, published in the Forbes & Wolfe 
Nanotech Report.  However, it has been acknowledged that nanotechnology is still in its 
early stage of development, as was information technology in the 1960s and biotechnol-
ogy in the 1980s (Arnall 2003), and its applications did not make a significant impact on 
industry until 2006 (Miles and Jarvis, 2001). 
 
2.2 The history of nanotechnology 
The concept of nanotechnology was envisioned early in 1959 by Nobel laureate 
physicist Richard Feynman in his lecture “There is Plenty of Room at the Bottom” 
(NSTC 1999).  He predicted that materials and devices at the atomic or molecular scale 
would bring about new discoveries and opportunities, and new sets of miniaturized in-
struments would be needed to operate on these nano structures. The term ”nanotechnol-
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ogy” was first coined in 1974 by Japanese researcher Nobuhiko Taniguchi to describe the 
precision manufacture of materials on a nanometer scale and then extended by Eric Drex-
ler (1992) as the fabrication of materials and products with the precise positioning of 
molecules in accordance with an explicit engineering design (Smith 1998).  
Table 2.1   Top 10 nanotech products in 2003 
Product Tech Company Manufacturer 
High-Performance Ski Wax Cerax Nanowax Nanogate 
Breathable Waterproof Ski Jacket Nano-Tex Franz Ziener GmbH & Co 
Wrinkle-Resistant, Stain-Repellent Threads Nano-Tex Eddie Bauer 
Deep-Penetrating Skin Cream L'Oréal L'Oréal 
World's First OLED Digital Camera Kodak Kodak 
Nanotech DVD and Book Collection   
Performance Sunglasses Nanofilm  
Nanocrystalline Sunscreen BASF NuCelle 
High-Tech Tennis Rackets Nanoledge Babolat 
High-Tech Tennis Balls InMat Wilson 
Source: Forbes & Wolfe Nanotech Report 2003 (Link: www.forbes.com) 
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In 1981, Gerd Binnig and Heinrich Rohrer invented the Scanning Tunneling Mi-
croscope, capable of displaying images of individual atoms, which led to the inventors’ 
winning the Nobel Prize in 1986 and their induction into the US National Inventors Hall 
of Fame in 1994. Another exemplary breakthrough is the 1986 invention of the atomic 
force microscope, which could display images of non-conducting surfaces, including bio-
logical entities, and was later used in machining and cutting operations (Smith 1998).  
These inventions mark the birth of the nanotechnology industry (NSTC 1999), 
and since then, nanotechnology research has begun to take on a clearer definition. Start-
ing in the 1990s, advances in nanotechnology research took place in various areas, in-
cluding miniature medical robotics, the organic chemistry of molecular machinery, DNA 
structures, the treatment of proteins as modular devices, and cellular conveyor systems 
(Smith 1998).  As a result of such revolutionary breakthroughs, together with the poten-
tial social and economic benefits, nanotechnology has also attracted the attention of gov-
ernments. It has been listed as one of six priority areas by the National Science Founda-
tion (NSF) in the United States; it was one of the themes in the Sixth EU Framework 
Program for Research and Technological Development in Europe; and it has been the fo-
cus of research in countries worldwide. The United States government has expedited its 
support of nanotechnology since the approval of National Nanotechnology Initiative 
(NNI) in 2001. Table 2.2 presents a brief review of the milestones in the history of 
nanotechnology. 
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Table 2.2   Milestones in the development of nanotechnology 
Year Event 
1959 Richard Feynman delivers his “There is Plenty of Room at the Bottom” talk.  
1974 The term “nanotechnology” is coined by Japanese researcher Nobuhiko Taniguchi. 
1981 Gerd Binnig and Heinrich Rohrer invent the Scanning Tunneling Microscope, ca-
pable of displaying images of individual atoms.  
1986 Drake, Prater, Weisenhorn, Gould, Albrecht, Quate, Cannell, H. G. Hansma, and P. 
K. Hansma develop the atomic force microscope, which can display images of 
non-conducting surfaces including biological entities.  
1987 Eric Drexler and Chris Peterson found the Foresight Institute, which promotes and 
advances nanotechnology.  
1990 The Institute of Physics publishes the first issue of Nanotechnology. 
1991 Nanotubes are manufactured for the first time by Sumio Iijima and P. M. Ajayan of 
NEC in Japan. 
1997 The U.S. Department of Defense Task Force on the Future of Military Healthcare 
(MHSS2020) forms the Committee on Nanotechnology and Biotechnology. 
1997 NSF issues an “Initiative Announcement” for research proposals in molecular 
nanotechnology. 
1998 The Interagency Working Group on Nanotechnology (IWGN) is formed to coordi-
nate federal work on the nanoscale. 
2001 NNI is set up. 
Reference: Smith (1998) 
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2.3 Debates surrounding nanotechnology 
Nanotechnology has economically valuable applications in a diverse range of in-
dustries, such as materials and manufacturing, as it has “the ability to synthesize nano-
scale building blocks with precisely controlled size and composition and then to assemble 
them into larger structures with unique properties and functions will revolutionize seg-
ments of the materials manufacturing industry,” nanoelectronics and computer technol-
ogy, medicine and health, aeronautics and space exploration, environment and energy, 
national security, global trade and competitiveness (NSTC 1999). The benefits that 
nanotechnology could proffer include greatly improved coatings, higher strength and 
hardness for materials, greater ductility and toughness, enhanced efficiency in optics, im-
proved catalysis, and novel magnetic properties (Smith 1998).  It is believed that 
nanotechnology will lead to the next industrial revolution. The US NSF predicts that “the 
entire semiconductor industry and half of the pharmaceutical industry will rely on 
nanotechnology in 10 years and that, by 2015, the global market will be 1 trillion US dol-
lars” (ETC-Group 2002). 
Various sources have made the following remarks on nanotechnology (NSTC 
1999):   
 NSF started the initiative – Synthesis and Processing of Nanoparticles – in 1991 
and “the National Nanofabrication User Network in 1994, and highlighted Nanoscale 
science and engineering in its fiscal year 1998 budget.” 
 The Department of Defense identified nanotechnology as a strategic research ob-
jective in 1997. 
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 At a congressional hearing in April 1998, Dr. Neal Lane, the former NSF director, 
recognized nanotechnology as the area that would most likely produce the break-
throughs of tomorrow 
 In March 1998, the President’s Science Advisor, Dr. John H. Gibbons, identified 
nanotechnology as one of the six technologies that would determine economic devel-
opment in the next century. 
 The National Institutes of Health identified nanobiotechnology as a topic of in-
terest in its 1999 Bioengineering Consortium (BECON) program. 
 
However, alongside the commendations has been dissention on the promising fu-
ture created by nanotechnology.  This difference of opinion is reflected in the debate be-
tween the Foresight Institute and Scientific American in 1996-1997 (Foresight 1997). The 
first concern involves the amount of fanfare that nanotechnology has received, and 
whether it is worthy of such publicity.  After all, since many scientists believe that not all 
the blueprints are realizable, they are cautious about just how much nanotechnology can 
achieve. For example, NNI has been criticized for “using nano as a convenient tag to at-
tract funding for a whole range of new science and technologies” (Roy 2002; Arnall 
2003). Advocates of nanotechnology are labeled as nanoenthusiasts and asked to be re-
sponsible for “recklessly setting impossibly high expectations for the economic benefits” 
(Economist, 2002). Some highly-respected nano scientists such as George M. Whitesides, 
Richard E. Smalley, and Philip Ball, are also skeptical about the feasibility of nanoscale 
manufacturing, arguing that the concept of nanotechnology does not fit laws of physics 
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and chemistry (Wood , Jones et al. 2003).  They are worried that the fanfare resulting 
from advances in nanotechnology may become a barrier to commercial involvement if 
companies form an unrealistic impression of the applications of nanotechnology (DTI 
2002). 
Other scientists have raised concerns about social equity, environmental, and ethi-
cal issues.  Although this group does not question the ability of nanotechnology to change 
the future, they suggest an alternative future transformed by nanotechnology in an apoca-
lyptic way (Wood , Jones et al. 2003).  Wood et al. argued that nanotechnology has the 
potential to be used for harmful purposes, leading to destructive rather than constructive 
results if the knowledge is abused.  For example, the convergence of nanotechnology 
with robotics and genetics will generate greater power and consequently more danger. In 
addition, nanotechnology may have some unexpected consequences, such as drug resis-
tance to certain viruses, chemical pollution, and nuclear accidents, which other technolo-
gies have produced. New classes of nanosubstances could adversely affect the stability of 
cell walls or disturb the immune system when inhaled or digested (Freitas 2003). In other 
words, technologists might not be able to fully control nanotechnology and nanomachines. 
Bill Joy (2000) has an extreme dystopian view on this issue, warning that nanotechnology 
could result in “our own extinction” as the world is destroyed by technological accidents 
and human beings are replaced by robotic technologies.  Thus, he has recommended the 
complete relinquishment of nanotechnology such as the cancellation of research on bio-
logical weapons in the 1970s. 
 
 17
2.4 New nanotechnology-based firms 
Nanotechnology creates a market by replacing the current market and provides 
exponential improvements in the value perceived and received by the customer. However, 
since nanotechnological innovations are incremental but discontinuous, and the discover-
ies break through typical technology capabilities, nanotechnology is referred to as a po-
tentially disruptive technology (Anderson and Tushman 1990; Libaers 2004).  Large es-
tablished firms are poor producers of disruptive technologies, as they tend to externalize 
research by acquiring small external start-up companies (Ferrary 2003). Even when in-
house research is carried out in large firms, research activities are not part of the core 
business. Instead of focusing on developing and marketing nano-related products, estab-
lished companies typically invest in nanotechnology in order to integrate it into their ex-
isting technology platforms (Miller, Serrato et al. 2005).  Hence, this thesis does not con-
sider these established companies as nanotechnology companies. 
As in other emerging high technologies,  start-up enterprises account for the ma-
jority of firms working in the nanotechnological field (Darby and Zucker 2003; Miller, 
Serrato et al. 2005). Because they are always the main actors in the transfer and commer-
cialization of disruptive technologies through the process of discontinuous innovation, 
these new technology-based firms are of particular interest to policy scientists (Mansfield 
1968). Besides, they play a critical role in maintaining a dynamic economy, generating 
employment growth, and bringing new technologies to market (Utterback, Meyer et al. 
1988; Heirman and Clarysse 2004). Over a five-year period, entry in manufacturing in-
dustries accounted for half of the increase in employment in the U.S. (Baldwin and John-
son 1999). For this reason, this thesis focuses on new nanotechnology-based firms 
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(NNBFs), defined as those established based on nano-related technologies, and on the 
development of nanotechnological processes, materials, tools, and devices, and their in-
troduction to the market. Figure 2.1 illustrates the growth in the number of NNBFs in the 
last 15 years.1 Although a few companies were established before 1990, the majority 
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Figure 2.1   Number of new nanotechnology-based firms, 1990-2005 
 
These NNBFs are mostly young, small, and still in the early stage of development. 
The age of these firms ranges from 1 to 26, the average age in 2007 being 9. Seventy-two 
percent of these firms are under 10 years old. The number of employees working in the 
                                                 
1 The search strategy of NNBFs is explained in Chapter 5. 
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firms varies from 1 to 190, the average being 21. Eighty percent of the firms have fewer 
than 30 employees. Firm performance varies a lot in terms of sales, from $18,000 to 
$34.7 million, while the medium sales in 2005 were $2.2 million.2  However, the distri-
bution of firms is rather even, 26 percent with sales of less than $0.5 million, 19 percent 
with $0.5-$1 million, 44 percent with $1-5 million, and 11 percent with over $5 million.  
These firms work in different areas of nanotechnology (Figure 2.2). Nanomateri-
als and nanodevices & nanoelectronics are the main focus of the nanotechnology industry 
in this stage, accounting for almost 77 percent of the production of the firms, followed by 
nanobiotechnology, accounting for 22 percent of production. Another 1 percent of firms 
work in other areas, such as nanochemistry and nano-clean-energy.  The areas are defined 











Figure 2.2   Composition of the nanotechnology industry 
                                                 
2 The sales information of 37 firms is missing. Therefore, the statistics on sales are calculated based on the 
remaining 193 firms. 
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Table 2.3   Areas of nanotechnology research 
Area of Nanotechnology Key Terms 
Nanomaterials • Nanowires 
• Nanotubes 
• Nanocrystals 




Nanobiotechnology  • Biomolecular devices 
• Biosensors 
• Molecular motors 
• Biomolecular fabric 
• Cellular biology 
• Drug discovery and delivery 
Nanodevices & Nanoelectronics • Nanocomputers 
• Semiconductors 
• Nanolithography 
• Thin films 
Source: Modified from Porter, Youtie et al. (2007 forthcoming) 
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The NNBFs, indicated by the purple dots in Figure 2.3, are distributed in 33 states, 
mostly along the east and west coasts. The states leading in terms of hosting NNBFs are 
California and Massachusetts, home to 18 percent and 11 percent of NNBFs respectively, 
followed by Texas (7 percent) and New York (6 percent). The green dots in Figure 2.3 
represent universities with nanotechnology R&D, measured as having at least ten publi-




Figure 2.3   Geographical distribution of NNBFs in the U.S. 
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CHAPTER 3: R&D ACTIVITY IN NANOTECHNOLOGY 
Due to its knowledge-intensive nature, R&D plays a key role in the development 
of nanotechnology, in which university-industry interaction is relatively active. This 
chapter reviews the input and output of nanotechnology R&D in the United States and 
compares industrial and university R&D activities.  This chapter discusses input in terms 
of funding sources for nanotech R&D and research output in terms of publications and 
patents for both academia and industry.   
 
 3.1 Funding for nanotech R&D 
In 2005, a total of $9.6 billion in R&D funding was devoted to nanotechnology 
worldwide (Luxresearch, 2006).  The main source was government funding, $4.6 billion, 
followed by corporate R&D, $4.5 billion, and venture capital, $0.497 billion (Figure 3.1). 
Not surprisingly, the United States has provided the most funding:  $1.6 billion from the 





35% of world total
Corporate funding 
$1.8 billion
40% of world total
Venture capital 
$0.46 billion
93% of world total
   
Figure 3.1   Funding for nanotech R&D in the U.S. in 2005 
Source:  Computed from Luxresearch (2006) 
 
While corporate funding is available primarily from large firms with sufficient 
funds and venture capital is highly concentrated in a small number of start-up firms, of 
which only ten percent received 43 percent of the funding (Luxresearch 2006), govern-
ment funding has gone to general start-up firms.   
 
3.1.1 Government funding for nanotechnology 
The U.S. and Japan, accounting for more than half of the world total, have been 
the largest government R&D spenders on nanotechnology.  The EU and the other regions 
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of the world shared the remainder.  In 1997-2005, the United States government has spent 
$5 billion on nanotechnology R&D, with an average annual growth rate of 34 percent 
















Figure 3.2   Government nanotechnology R&D investments (in millions of US dol-
lars), 1997-2005 
Source: PCAST (2005) 
 
Since 2001, the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) has been the primary 
program coordinating federal investment in nanotechnology. The principal federal agen-
cies that provide research funds for nanotechnology include the Department of Defense 
(DOD), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy (DOE), the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the Department of Commerce 
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(DOC), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of 
Transportation (DOT).  Among these agencies, the DOD (30%), the NSF (27%), the 
DOE (18%) and the DHHS (12%) were the leading contributors, jointly providing 88 per-
cent of the funds. Among the remaining agencies, the DOC accounted for 7 percent of 
nanotechnology R&D investment, NASA 3 percent, the EPA 0.6 percent, the USDA 0.3 
percent, the DOJ 0.12 percent, the DHS 0.11 percent, and the DOT 0.03 percent. Figure 
3.3 presents the NNI budget for nanotechnology from main funding agencies between 

















Figure 3.3   Estimated federal investments in nanotechnology (in millions of dollars), 
2001-2008  
Source: The NNI budget (http://www.nano.gov/html/about/funding.html) 
 
The DOD is the largest contributor to nanotechnology, but its budget has fluctu-
ated over the years. In 2004, the budget dropped by 10, and in 2007 and 2008, the budget 
is expected to drop again by 2 and 10 percent, respectively.  The budget of the NSF, the 
second largest contributor to nanotechnology, has grown steadily at an average of 15 per-
cent between 2001 and 2008. The budgets of the DOE and the DHHS have exhibited a 
similar trend as that of the NSF, but increasing at an even faster rate of 23 percent and 28 
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percent, respectively. By contrast, the budgets of the DOC and NASA appear to have sta-
bilized over time. 
 
3.1.2 Destination of government funding in nanotechnology 
Since the last decade, around three quarters of all federal funding for nanotech-
nology has gone to academia. The other sectors that have received funds are industry 
(14.1 percent), non-profit organizations (non-educational) (2.7 percent), the federal gov-
ernment (1.7 percent), the state government (0.3 percent), and other sectors (6.3 percent), 
including the National Academy of Sciences, and national labs and hospitals (Figure 3.4).  
Most firms that have received federal funding are new technology-based firms supported 
through programs such as Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), Small Business 






















Figure 3.4   Destination of federal funding in nanotechnology, 1993-2005 
Source: RaDIUS database (https://radius.rand.org/) 
 
3.2 Publications 
Since 1990, the number of publications on nanotechnology has increased expo-
nentially. Using the search terms developed by the Georgia Tech team working on the 
CNS-ASU project (Porter, Youtie et al. 2007 forthcoming), the number of publications 
on nanotechnology by U.S. authors in the Science Citation Index (SCI) reached 15,000 in 
2005, 34 times that in 1990. As shown in PCAST (2005), the United States continues to 
dominate publications on nanotechnology in both general SCI journals or in a subset of 
high-impact journals, more than twice the number from the second highest country, 
China. However, the gap between the United States and other countries is closing. The 
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proportion of nanotechnology publications by U.S. authors declined from 40 percent in 
the early 1990s to 30 percent in 2004. 
As in other disciplines, publications from universities play an important role in 
the development of nanotechnological research. University scientists have contributed 
over 80 percent of publications in nanotechnology (Figure 3.5), and this share has in-
creased over the years.  In contrast, although sustaining slow but steady growth, industry 












Figure 3.5   SCI publications on nanotechnology in the U.S. by year 
 
As expected, most of the institutions that lead in the number of publications in 
nanotechnology are academic (Table 3.1). The United States Navy and Oak Ridge Na-
tional Lab are the only non-university organizations that have been productive in publish-
 30
ing. By 2006, approximately 700 universities had published at least one paper in 
nanotechnology. Most universities perform well in terms of publications partly due to the 
fact that they are home to the top scientists in the field of nanotechnology, the main au-
thors of publications. As shown in Table 3.2, these scientists alone contributed 20% to 
25% of the publications in their respective institutions.   
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Table 3.1   Top institutions in terms of SCI publications in nanotechnology in the 
U.S., 1990-2006 
Rank University Number of Publications 
1 University of Illinois – Urbana Champaign 2,950 
2 University of California – Berkeley 2,947 
3 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2,578 
4 University of California – Santa Barbara 2,437 
5 Pennsylvania State University 1,954 
6 Harvard University 1,857 
7 Northwestern University 1,834 
8 US Navy 1,813 
9 Oak Ridge National Laboratory 1,795 
10 University of Michigan – Ann Arbor 1,634 
11 Georgia Institute of Technology 1,594 
12 Stanford University 1,594 
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Table 3.2   The top 10 authors of SCI publications in nanotechnology in the U.S., 
1990-2006 
Rank Author Affiliation Number 
of Pubs 
1 Gossard, Arthur C. University of California – Santa Barbara 355 
2 Whitesides, George M. Harvard University 308 
3 Dresselhaus, Mildred 
S. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 305 
4 Wang, Zhonglin Georgia Institute of Technology 277 
5 Petroff, Pierre M. University of California – Santa Barbara 229 
6 Pfeiffer, Loren N. Lucent Technology 211 
7 Smalley, Richard E. Rice University 201 
8 Ferry, David K. Arizona State University 197 
9 Lieber, Charles M. Harvard University 194 
10 Mirkin, Chad A. Northwestern University 192 
 
In addition to the large share of publications from academia, university science 
also plays an important role in industry research. In the industry sector, while over 3,000 
firms have published at least one paper in nanotechnology, two-thirds of them, 70 percent 
of which were NNBFs, collaborated with university scientists. In other words, nearly half 
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of the publications from the industry sector were affiliated with university addresses 














Figure 3.6   Publications on nanotechnology from firm scientists, 1990-2005 
 
Out of the 700 universities that engage in nanotechnology research, approxi-
mately 290 collaborate with industry. Table 3.3 presents the universities and firms that 
most actively collaborate in university-industry research. Not surprisingly, over half rep-
resent those with the most publications, listed in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.3   The top 10 university/industry collaborators and the number of collabo-
rative publications, 1990-2006 
Rank Most Active Universities # of 
Co-
Pubs 
 Rank Most Active Firms # of 
Co-
Pubs 
1 Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 
172 1 IBM Corp. 643 
2 University of California – 
Berkeley 
168 2 Lucent Technology 129 
3 Stanford University 165 3 Dupont Co. Inc. 92 
4 University of Illinois – Ur-
bana Champaign 
156 4 Intel Corp. 90 
5 University of Minnesota 132 5 Motorola Inc. 88 
6 North Carolina State Uni-
versity 
114 6 Eastman Kodak Co. 79 
7 Arizona State University 112 7 Xerox Corp. 72 
8 Cornell University 104 8 ExxonMobil Co. 71 
9 University of Florida 103 9 Dow Chemical Co. USA 68 
10 Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity 
99 10 Procter & Gamble Co. 44 
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Interestingly, universities active in collaborating with industry partners work 
mostly with large established companies. However, the list of the universities most inter-
ested in working with NNBFs significantly differs (Table 3.4). The only universities that 
appear on both lists are the University of Florida and Pennsylvania State University.  
Table 3.4   The top 10 university/NNBF collaborators and the number of collabora-
tive publications, 1990-2006 
Rank Most Active Universities # of 
Co-
Pubs 
 Rank Most Active NNBFs # of 
Co-
Pubs 
1 Rutgers University 23 1 Zyvex Corp. 23 
2 University of Connecticut 21 2 Hysitron Inc. 21 
3 University of Florida 17 3 Material Modification Inc. 20 
4 University of New Mexico 15 4 Inframat Corp. 17 
5 University of Texas – Austin 14 5 NEI Inc. 14 
6 Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity 
12 6 Evans E Inc. 10 
7 University of Maryland – 
College Park 
11 7 BioForce Nanoscience 
Inc. 
9 
8 Princeton University 11 8 Epion Corp. 9 
9 University Arkansas 11 9 Zia Laser Inc. 9 
10 University of North Carolina 
– Chapel Hill 
10 10 Asylum Research 8 
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3.3 Patents 
Whereas publications are used as indicators of research output, patents are often 
used as indicators of technology innovation. Similar to publications, the number of 
nanotechnology-related patents has grown rapidly.  According to PCAST (2005), the 
number of such patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in-
creased by 50 percent between 2000 and 2003. More than 60 percent of nanotechnology 
patents issued by the USPTO between 1997 and 2003 were awarded to industry, universi-
ties, and other organization in the United States.  Japan, Germany, Canada, and France 
represent the other top patent holders.  
Broken down by sector, around eighty percent of the patents issued by the USP-
TO3 were assigned to industry between 1990 and 2005, ten percent to universities, and 
ten percent to other organizations such as national labs, research institutes, hospitals, and 
so forth (Figure 3.7). In spite of the large number of patents from industry, the growth in 
industry patents is slow compared with that in the other two sectors. The average annual 
growth rate between 1990 and 2005 was 12 percent for industry patents, 30 percent for 
university patents, and 20 percent for patents from other organizations. Correspondingly, 
the share of industry patents decreased from 88 percent in 1990 to 68% in 2005. The lost 
share was taken largely by universities, whose proportion increased from 6 percent to 22 
percent, and partly by other organizations, whose proportion increased from 6 percent to 
10 percent.  
                                                 
3Between 2000 and 2005, more than half of nanotechnology patents issued by the USPTO had no assignee 
information. They were either assigned to individuals or not yet assigned. Thus, these patents are not in-


















Figure 3.7   USPTO patents in nanotechnology by publication year, 1990-2005 
 
Among the thirteen assignees holding more than 100 patents in nanotechnology in 
1990-2005, eleven were large companies, two exceptions being the University of Cali-
fornia and the U.S. Navy (Table 3.5). These top thirteen institutions were awarded 24 
percent of the nanotechnology patents issued by the USPTO.   In addition to these giant 
patent holders, around 2,000 companies, including 138 NNBFs and 200 universities, have 
been granted nanotechnology patents by the USPTO.  Table 3.6 presents a list of univer-
sities that hold at least 20 nanotechnology patents. Due to the regulation of intellectual 
property, patents are assigned to the university system instead of individual university 
campuses, so the list compares university systems, which differs from the other tables.  
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Table 3.5   The top assignees of USPTO patents in nanotechnology, 1990-2005 
Rank Assignee # Patents 
1 International Business Machines Corporation 388 
2 Xerox Corporation 259 
3 University of California 238 
4 Eastman Kodak Company 225 
5 L'Oreal S.A 196 
6 Micron Technology, Inc. 190 
7 General Electric Company 173 
8 NEC Corporation 144 
9 Motorola, Inc. 139 
10 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 133 
11 Intel Corporation 128 
12 3M Innovative Properties Company 119 
13 United States of America, Navy 101 
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Table 3.6   Universities active in nanotechnology patenting, 1990-2005 
Rank Assignee # Patents 
1 University of California 238 
2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 79 
3 California Institute of Technology 53 
4 Rice University  43 
5 University of Texas 37 
6 University of Michigan 28 
7 Cornell University 26 
8 University of Chicago 26 
9 Stanford University 24 
10 Harvard University 23 
11 University of Illinois 23 




Although universities are not the principal holders of nanotechnology patents, 
their contribution to the development of nanotechnology should not be underestimated. 
After all, 35 universities are co-assignees with firms on nanotechnology patents, and nu-
merous university professors are the sole inventors in firm patents (Table 3.7). In addition 
to invention, university scientists play an important role in the commercialization of 
nanotechnology. The majority of intellectual property licensed by nanotech startups 
comes from universities (Waitz and Bokhari 2003), and 70 percent of university 
nanotechnology-related inventions cannot be properly commercialized without the in-
volvement of inventors (Darby and Zucker 2003). The important role of universities in 
nanotech R&D can also be evidenced in the Top 5 nanotech breakthroughs reported by 
Forbes. Most of the researchers involved in the breakthroughs have been affiliated with 




Table 3.7   Universities active in co-patenting with firms, 1990-2005 
Rank Assignee # Co-Patents 
1 Duke University 11 
2 University of California 6 
3 University of Tennessee 4 
4 University of Arizona 3 
4 Iowa State University 3 
6 University of Chicago 2 
6 Boston University 2 
6 California Institute of Technology 2 
6 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2 
6 Northwestern University 2 
6 Rutgers University 2 
6 Stanford University 2 
6 University of Michigan 2 




Table 3.8   The top 5 nanotech breakthroughs in 2006 (Wolfe 2006) 
Breakthroughs Researchers Affiliations 
DNA Origami Paul W. K.Rothemund California Institute of 
Technology 
Nanomagnets to clean 
up drinking water 
Vicki Colvin, Amy Kan, William Yu, 
J.T.Mayo, Arjun Prakash, Joshua Falk-
ner, Sujin Yean, Lili Cong, Cafer T. Ya-






Charles Lieber, Fernando Patolsky, Brian 
Timko, Guihua Yu, Ying Fang, Andrew 




Phaedon Avouris, Zhihong Chen, Joerg 
Appenzeller, Yu-Ming Lin, Paul Solo-
mon; Jennifer Sippel-Oakley and An-
drew Rinzler; Jinyao Tang and Shalom 
Wind  
IBM; University of Flor-
ida; Columbia University 
Nanoparticles destory 
prostate cancer 
Robert Langer; Omid Farokhzad, Ben-
jamin Teply, Ines Sherifi, Jerome Richie; 
Jianjun Cheng; Sangyong Jon; Philip 
Kantoff  
Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology; BWH; Har-
vard University; Gwangju 
Institute of Science and 
Technology, South Ko-
rea; Dana Farber Cancer 
Institute 
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CHAPTER 4: SOCIAL CAPITAL AND RESOURCE SPILLOVER 
 
Although university-industry interaction has been a focus of research for many 
years, the rationale behind the motivation for such interaction has not received much at-
tention. This study notes the importance of several concepts in social capital theory that 
motivate firms to collaborate with universities and reap the associated benefits. This 
chapter begins by reviewing the origin of social capital theory and the various definitions 
of social capital and continues with a discussion of the basic concepts of social capital 
and their applications to university-industry relationships.  It follows with a discussion of 
research hypotheses and variable measurement. The chapter ends with a brief summary. 
 
4.1 Overview of social capital theory 
Classical economists have always regarded land, labor, and physical capital as the 
three main resources shaping economic growth.  However, if they are owned solely by 
individuals, these resources have a limited impact unless people can access each other's 
resources and disseminate their information and knowledge. Thus, as the quality of work-
ers was found to play an important role in determining how productivity of the other fac-
tors,  Neo-classical economists of the 1960s recognized the importance of a new resource:  
human, or social capital (Woolcock 1998).  
Social capital originates from relationships in civil society, such as family, 
schools, local communities, firms, associations, gender, and ethnicity (OECD 2001). The 
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family is the primary source of social capital, as family members receive both materials 
and emotional support from each other. Schools and firms are the formal institutions that 
provide education and work experience for the accumulation of human capital and also 
build social networks based on the relationships of classmates, schoolmates, and col-
leagues. Communities, neighborhoods, and associations also provide a social network 
that benefits its members. Social interaction among neighbors and group members pro-
vides opportunities for them to work together toward a common good. Social capital can 
also be built on gender and ethnicity, both of which provide members with opportunities 
to share common values and culture and bond for their mutual benefit. The importance of 
trust, partnerships, and collaborative ventures have been increasingly emphasized in the 
new economic literature, in which innovation is regarded as dependent on collaborative 
activities across different sectors such as industry and academia.   
The concept of social capital was initiated in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. 
Bourdieu proposed the term “culture capital” and used it to describe the resources avail-
able through the network (Bourdieu 1986). In his work, Bourdieu stated that social capi-
tal has two elements:  social relationships, which allow people to access resources pos-
sessed by other people, and the amount and quality of these resources (Portes 1998). 
Coleman further analyzed the generation of social capital and its consequences (Coleman 
1988). He also stressed that social capital complements human capital (OECD 2001). 
Putnam emphasized the role of social capital in improving the efficiency of society and 
fostering social cohesion (Putnam 1993). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) explained social 
capital in terms of three dimensions: the existence of connections, trust developed across 
these connections, and shared understanding among members. This concept emphasizes 
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shared norms and values, which promote communication. While Coleman and Putnam 
claimed that dense networks were major components of social capital, Granovetter (1973) 
and Burt (1992) highlighted the role of weak ties or the absence of social ties, or the 
“structural hole.” They argued that weak ties provide new sources of ideas and informa-
tion and additional opportunities, and the number of holes indicates the volume of re-
sources that can be brokered from different sides of the holes. Table 4.1 presents the 
various statements of social capital. 
These various elaborations of social capital theory differ mainly in their treatment 
of the social network versus the resources acquired through it, the number of resources 
versus the ability to obtain them, the dense network versus the loose network, individual 
human capital versus collective social capital, and the possessors of social capital versus 
the sources of social capital.  Despite their differences, they share the notion that social 
capital is relational instead of individual and that it represents the ability of actors to ob-
tain resources by being members of social structures (Portes 1998; OECD 2001). 
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Table 4.1   Various definitions of social capital 
Definition Author 
"The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to pos-
session of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance or recognition." 
(Bourdieu 
1986) 
"A variety of entities with two elements in common: They all consist of some 
aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – 
whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure." 
(Coleman 
1988) 
"Social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or 
less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition." 
(Burt 1992) 
"Social capital refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, 




"The sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available 
through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an indi-
vidual or social unit. It comprises both the network and the assets that may 




"Social capital is an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation 
between two or more individuals." 
(Fukuyama 
2000) 
"Networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facili-





The positive consequence of social capital is apparent. It can be seen as a com-
plement to human capital (Coleman 1988) and expands the scope and scale of resources 
that an individual can mobilize. Its usefulness has been proven in various studies on ac-
cess to employment, mobility through occupational ladders, and entrepreneurial success 
(Portes 1998).  On a societal level, it builds trust, encourages acceptance of norms and 
shared values, reduces uncertainty and risk, promotes exchange, savings, and investment 
(Fukuyama 2002), and improves the efficiency of society through coordinated action 
(Putnam 1993). 
However, critics argue that the benefits that social capital confers upon its group 
members are accompanied by the loss of outsiders. An empirical study conducted by 
Robert Cushing found that regions ranked high on an innovation index ranked low on 
Putnam's measures of social capital (Florida 2002). Cushing and other scholars argued 
that social ties may promote inward-seeking social interactions, exclude outsiders, and 
impede the building of trust and cooperation on the wider community level (Portes and 
Landolt 1996; Portes 1998; OECD 2001).  It can also be used by one group against other 
groups (OECD 2001).  Nevertheless, it is important to note that most of these problems 
occur in dense networks and can be remedied by weaker ties, a looser network, or a wide 
radius of trust (Fukuyama 2000). Unlike strong ties, which consume more time and en-
ergy, weak ties require less investment and are more manageable (Granovetter 1973). In 
addition, they have a lower entry threshold and allow people to move in and out easily. 
Therefore, places with looser networks and weaker ties are more open to novel combina-
tions of resources and ideas (Florida 2002).  
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Other negative consequences of social capital have also been discussed. For ex-
ample, some components of social capital such as public or private goods, which are 
dominated by externalities,  risk underinvestment due to the free-rider impact since peo-
ple can benefit from the contribution of others, and the contributors do not fully appreci-
ate its benefit (OECD 2001).  Social capital also restricts individual freedom and personal 
autonomy, so successful group members are pressured to assist other members (Portes 
1998).  
 
4.2 Applications of social capital theory 
Social capital theory has popular applications in social studies, such as school at-
trition, academic performance, children's intellectual development, employment and oc-
cupational attainment, juvenile delinquency and its prevention, and immigrant and ethnic 
enterprises (Portes 1998). The literature emphasizes the norms of society and the sources 
of human motivation (OECD 2001).  Social capital theory has also been applied to eco-
nomic and political studies with a focus on the investment strategies and the role of insti-
tutions and social arrangements, respectively (OECD 2001). Also under study has been 
the question of whether or not the stock of social capital will be enhanced or destroyed by 
the intervention of the state, or government (Woolcock 1998).  
In the science and technology policy area, social capital is regarded as a facilitator 
of the creation of human capital.  Studies have explored the use of social capital to pro-
mote scientific research productivity and suggested that social capital be added to evalua-
tion models (Bozeman, Dietz et al. 2001) so that instead of concentrating solely at the 
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immediate outcomes of a project, one should devote more attention to sustained knowl-
edge capabilities the project generates. Furthermore, social capital theory has been tested 
in a regional growth model that examines whether social capital can account for innova-
tion and economic growth (Florida 2002). This thesis applies social capital theory to the 
area of the university-industry partnership.  
 
4.3 Theoretical framework 
As social capital comprises both social networks and resources that can be mobi-
lized through networks, concepts will be explained within the context of these two vari-
ables. The concept “resource spillover” refers to the spillover effects of various resources 
of university scientists such as the human capital, social capital, and positional capital on 
collaborating firms. Based on the resources in these three dimensions, three hypotheses 
are proposed. 
 
4.3.1 Network structure 
Social capital resides in social networks in which actors and social ties are the 
primary elements. Actors, which refer to the social entities under study, can be people, 
groups, organizations, regions, or events (Wasserman and Faust 1999). A social tie, by 
definition, is a link between a pair of actors, such as kinship (family members), an emo-
tional relationship (friendships), the transfer of material resources (buying or selling), the 
transfer of non-material resources (lecturer and audience), and an organization attach-
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ment (colleagues) (Ibid). One social tie can represent different relationships.  For exam-
ple, the relationship between a university scientist and a firm scientist can be an emo-
tional relationship, or a friendship, or it can involve the transfer of material resources, 
when the firm scientist uses the equipment of the university scientist, or it could involve a 
transfer of non-material resources, when the university scientist learns the marketing in-
formation of the technology from the firm scientist, or sharing memberships in the same 
association.   
Network structures fall into different categories, such as the one-mode network, 
the two-mode network, and the ego-centered network (Wasserman and Faust 1999). The 
mode indicates the number of sets of entities in the structure. A one-mode network is the 
basic type of network with only a single set of actors. A two-mode network consists of 
two sets of actors, each of which can be either the same type or different types. For ex-
ample, one set of actors can consist of people, and the other set of actors the affiliations 
of the people. The relationships among the people and their affiliations and between the 
people and the affiliations comprise the network. Although the networks could be a three-
mode or even higher-mode networks, so far, no network analysis method can analyze 
such a complicated structure. Another type of the social network is an ego-centered net-
work, which contains a focal actor "ego" and other actors,   or "alters," which are linked 
to ego. Social ties exist between the ego and the alters, and also among the alters.  
Since firms are the focus of this study, the ego-centered network is used to model 
the relationship between high tech firms and university scientists.  In this structure, the 
firm is the ego and university scientists are the alters. However, as stated above,  because 
firms and university scientists can form numerous types of relationships, this thesis can-
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not cover all the types or compare one type with another. Instead, it will focus on the 
most important relationship: research collaboration.  As co-publishing is the typical out-
come of collaboration on research between university scientists and firm scientists, the 
remainder of the thesis will use co-authorship to measure scientific ties between firms 
and university scientists.  
 
4.3.2 Resources and resource spillover 
Resources, defined as normatively valued goods in a society, can be either as-
cribed or acquired. Ascribed resources are those one inherits, such as race, gender, or 
wealth, and parental resources. Acquired resources are those invested or obtained by one-
self, such as education, employment, and reputation (Lin 2003).  Not surprisingly, as-
cribed resources are strongly correlated with acquired resources.  After all, those from 
wealthier families have more opportunities to obtain a strong education; or those with 
more parental resources are more likely to gain better employment.  
All of the resources owned by the alter can be taken advantage of by the ego 
through their connections. For example, the ego can ask for financial assistance from the 
alter if the alter is wealthy; the ego can also ask the alter to solve technical problems if 
the alter is knowledgeable; the alter can introduce the ego to some groups if the alter has 
any membership; or at least the ego can learn some information from the alter. Hence, 
resources owned by a person benefits not only the owner but also other people who have 
a link to the owner. This thesis refers to this phenomenon as “resource spillover.”  
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The term “resource spillover” better captures the beneficial relationship between 
academia and industry than and other terms such as technology transfer or knowledge 
diffusion because it encompasses various factors that take part in the diffusion process.  
Such factors include not only technology and knowledge, the most prevailing in current 
knowledge, but also all the other resources of university scientists, including affiliation, 
social standing, reputation, power and network. Resource spillover can also occur both 
intentionally and unintentionally once a relationship is established. In some cases, re-
sources are utilized by other people, even without the consent of the owner, because of 
symbolic utility. Simply by mentioning that one has a close relationship with a well-
respected person, an individual may gain the trust of other people without having to in-
form the well-respected person whose reputation is borrowed without his or her knowl-
edge. As Lin (2003) pointed out, letting others know about one's social ties is sufficient 
for promoting his or her social standing.  
As an assumption of social capital theory, resources are distributed unequally in a 
society, where an individual in a higher position possesses greater social capital. Social 
structure, a pyramid shape, is comprised of positions that are rank-ordered according to 
the resources available to each position. There are fewer positions in the upper level, 
which has better resources and more positions than in the lower level, which has poorer 
resources and fewer positions. The higher the position a person can attain, the fewer 
competitors, the more accessible resources, and the better view of the structure he or she 
has. A position closer to the top not only includes more valued resources but also allows 
greater accessibility to resources attached to other positions, especially those in lower 
ranks (Lin 2003). 
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An ego has several advantages if it has access to an alter with better resources. 
First, the alter has well-embedded and commanded resources that benefit the ego. Second, 
in the pyramid structure of resource distribution, the alter with more resources has both a 
higher position and an advantageous view of the structure; thus, the alter can provide the 
ego with better information.  In addition, the alter with a higher social position possesses 
stronger social credentials, and the alter’s willingness to be linked with the ego ensure the 
ego's credentials. Finally, the ability to access the better-positioned alter enhances the 
ego's confidence in further interactions and actions (Ibid). 
 
4.3.3 Resource spillover from university to industry 
Given the fact that resource spillover is positively associated with resources pos-
sessed by the alter, or university scientists in our case, NNBFs naturally look for better- 
positioned scientists in the social structure when they collaborate with university scien-
tists. The collaboration between firms and university scientists is measured by the num-
ber of co-authored publications. Co-authorship has been used as an indicator of research 
collaboration in many studies (Otte and Rousseau 2002) since it is the most tangible way 
to structure scientific activities (Peters and van Raan 1991).  
One needs to be aware that co-authorship is not a perfect indicator of collabora-
tion due to honorific co-authorship, by which co-authorship credits appear to be irrespon-
sible (Cason 1992). Cases also exist where researchers work closely together but decide 
to publish their results separately or researchers who have not worked together but decide 
to pool their findings and write jointly (Katz and Martin 1997). Nevertheless, co-
 54
authorship is found to be positively correlated with collaborative activities (Glanzel and 
Schubert 2004) and “co-authorship credits cover all collaborators that substantially and 
technically contribute to their co-authored papers” (Yoshikane, Nozawa et al. 2006). By 
establishing collaborative relationships with university scientists through the active pub-
lication of papers, firm researchers can earn their trust and gain access to the tacit knowl-
edge that is not codified, but otherwise accessible (Hicks 1995). 
The remainder of this chapter compares the quantity and quality of the resources 
owned by university scientists and their impact on related NNBFs through research col-
laboration as indicated by co-authored publications.  
 
4.3.3.1 Firm performance 
4.3.3.1.1 Innovation capability 
The impact of collaboration with university scientists on NNBFs was measured in 
two ways:  by the direct contribution to a firm’s innovation capabilities and the indirect 
contribution to a firm’s perceived technology potential and external investment potential. 
A university, as a producer of advanced knowledge, is the most favorable working part-
ner when a firm wants to enhance its research capabilities and output.  
Patent indicators are the most frequently used indicators for innovation capability 
among the few others such as publications, new products, and total factor productivity 
(Dernis, Dominique et al. 2000). Patent indicators show their strength in that patents are 
directly linked to inventions, and patent data are publicly available via patent offices and 
relatively easy to access. In addition, patent documents provide rich and categorized in-
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formation of invention, which is allowed to be aggregated at different levels such as by 
assignee, region, or industry for the different purposes of each study. Therefore, patent 
data, as an indicator of technological innovation, have been widely used in various stud-
ies (Griliches 1984; Pavitt 1985; Schmoch 1997).  
As discussed in the OECD (2005) and innumerable studies in the literature (Pavitt 
1985; Dernis, Dominique et al. 2000), patent indicators as a measure of innovation output 
are not without their drawbacks. First of all, patents do not represent all inventions. Some 
inventions are protected by other means such as trade secrecy, and others are simply not 
patentable. Secondly, the value of patents varies as some patents may have no industrial 
value while others can be used in a number of applications. Patent indicators are also cri-
tiqued for their inconsistency across countries and across industries.  
These disadvantages of patent indicators, however, are not important in the con-
text of this study. Since this thesis studies only patent statistics of firms in the nanotech-
nology industry in the United States, they do not vary across industries and countries. 
Furthermore, most innovations in nanotechnology are patentable.  Since high-tech firms 
often use patents to build technical credibility in order to participate in knowledge ex-
change and win orders (Waitz and Bokhari 2003), the patents capture most of the inven-
tions in nanotechnology. 
4.3.3.1.2 Perceived technology potential and investment potential 
On the other hand, by exhibiting collaboration with universities, firms implicitly 
announce their research capabilities at the benchmark level of their university collabora-
tors. As the costs of labor and setting up a laboratory are often prohibitive, NNBFs have 
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significant capital requirements. They must continuously seek external financial support. 
Raising funds requires the company to persuade investors or funding agencies to give 
them money under conditions of information asymmetry and uncertainty. Since 
nanotechnology and its related technologies are typically state-of-the-art and the technol-
ogy too complex for the lay person, the long-term benefits of investment are difficult for 
the funding agencies to assess (Waitz and Bokhari 2003). Thus, lacking the ability to 
thoroughly evaluate a technology, funding decision makers must often rely on perceived 
signals of quality (Gregorio and Shane 2003). As shown in several studies, researchers 
who have strong technical reputations tend to have more access to the external sources of 
high-quality knowledge and collaborate with other top-rated researchers (Hicks 1995; 
Furucawa and Goto 2005). Thus, the choice of collaborators can signal the potential and 
improve the reliability of a firm. Therefore, firms with ties with prolific university scien-
tists are more likely to acquire investment. 
As described in Chapter 3, government funding and venture capital are the main 
sources of funding for NNBFs. While government programs emphasize technology capa-
bilities, venture capitalists are more interested in the marketing potential and profitability 
of a firm since they invest for return. In other words, the ability to obtain funding from 
the government depends on the perceived technology potential of the firm. 
 
4.3.3.2 Resources of university scientists 
The resources of university scientists are examined in three dimensions: human 
capital, which consists of resources possessed by an individual; social capital, which in-
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cludes resources embedded in the networks possessed by the individual; and positional 
capital, which refers to resources represented by one's affiliation or associations.  
4.3.3.2.1 Human capital 
Human capital refers to the knowledge, skills, wealth, and reputation that an indi-
vidual possesses. In addition to the three types of resources accessible through social ties, 
as suggested by Lin (2003)—wealth, or economic assets, power, or political assets, and 
reputation, or social assets, this study adds a fourth type—intellectual capital, or knowl-
edge assets, which are characterized by relationships between a student and a teacher, 
those among conference participants, those among members of a study group, and others. 
These relationships carry no expectations of economic or political gain, but instead foster 
the exchange of ideas and skills, and broaden the scope and viewpoints of the participants. 
To maintain an advantage in competition, high tech firms must conduct ongoing 
R&D and develop advanced and marketable products. R&D not only creates new knowl-
edge but also enhances firms’ absorptive capacity, which is the ability to recognize and 
exploit external information that is critical to firms’ innovative capabilities (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990). Considering the importance of intellectual capital to the establishment 
of NNBFs, knowledge is not only the most prominent asset but  also the most desirable 
return that firms expect from their collaboration with university scientists (Zucker, Darby 
et al. 1998). After all, the scientific knowledge of university scientists can be transformed 
into technological capability within the firm through collaboration, training, and other 
experiences. Investors tend have higher expectation of firms collaborating with star scien-
tists because intellectual capital is reflected in their valuation of firms’ assets (Darby, Liu 
et al. 1999). The most productive university scientists tend to be more active in research 
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activities and are more likely to deliver their knowledge to partners, leading to the fol-
lowing hypotheses.  
H1: NNBFs that collaborate with more productive university scientists are more 
likely to have more research output. 
H2: NNBFs that collaborate with more productive university scientists are more 
likely to have higher perceived technology potential. 
H3: NNBFs that work with more productive university scientists are more likely 
to have higher external investment potential. 
Many studies have used the number of papers published in scientific journals as a 
measurement of the productivity of academic scientists. However, this measurement does 
not account for the fact that some scientists might have more publications simply because 
they have been working in the field for many years and not necessarily because they are 
more productive than others. By contrast, newcomers are at a disadvantage if their re-
search output is compared with that of senior scientists without taking into account the 
effort they have expended. Instead, the publication rate, or the amount of publications in 
a certain time window, better indicates a scientist’s research capability and productivity. 
In this thesis, the time window is set as one year, and the publication rate refers to the av-
erage number of publications that a scientist has per year. It is calculated as the total 
number of publications divided by the length of the scientist’s career.  
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4.3.3.2.2 Social capital 
Providing the basis for trust, cooperation, and collective action, social capital con-
stitutes a valuable resource.  Social networks provide access to more information and op-
portunities through contacts and connections, such as the “invisible college” (Price 1963; 
Crane 1972), weak ties (Granovetter 1973), and friends of friends (Boissevain 1974).  A 
dense network (i.e., or strong ties), which refers to close relationships such as family or 
colleagues, tend to have an overlapping network and share common sources of informa-
tion.  They are more likely to gain new information from weak ties, which are located in 
distant parts of the network. Relationships that constitute a loose network, or weak ties, 
can refer to those that don't have frequent contact or to those from a different working 
class or cultural background. Therefore, establishing contact with people who are directly 
connected, or a “structure hole,” can greatly reduce the redundancy of resources (Burt 
1992). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) suggest that these information channels reduce both 
the amount of time and investment required to gather information. An empirical study 
conducted by Crane (1969) shows that scientists with more social ties tend to have higher 
research productivity.  
As Burt (1992) pointed out, the ego can benefit from a network with a large num-
ber of indirect ties without too high of a network maintenance cost.  For a collaborating 
company, a scientific network of university scientists represents indirect social ties, one 
of the more desirable benefits of collaboration (Pavitt 1995).  The firm can translate such 
a tie into its own network, so the firm becomes embedded in the scientific community 
(Murray 2004) and has more opportunities to learn high quality knowledge.  
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H4: Collaborating with university researchers who have more social capital en-
hances the research productivity of NNBFs.  
H5: Collaborating with university researchers who have more social capital has 
a positive impact on the perceived technology potential of NNBFs. 
H6: Collaborating with university researchers who have more social capital has 
a positive impact on the external investment potential of NNBFs.  
The scientific network of university researchers can be indicated by the number of 
collaborators or by the size of the scientific community in which they work.  As most in-
formation typically travels through a maximum of one intermediary (Scott 1991), this 
study will take into account only direct contact between a university scientist and a firm. 
Co-authorship is again used to measure the amount of collaboration between a university 
scientist and other researchers.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates how the firm Transgenex Nanobiotech, Inc. is linked to the 
scientific community through its connection with the University of South Florida.  On the 
map, the links refer to co-publications.4 In this network, Transgenex Nanobiotech has 
direct access to only one university, the University of South Florida, which is its primary 
contact. However, all the contacts of the University of South Florida represent secondary 
contacts to Transgenex Nanobiotech. Having established a connection with the Univer-
sity of South Florida, the firm can also indirectly benefit from the resources of the secon-
dary contacts. 
                                                 
4 To simplify the diagram, only American institutions having more than 1 co-publication with University of 




Figure 4.1   Map of networks in the scientific community 
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4.3.3.2.3 Positional capital 
By establishing social ties with university scientists, high tech firms not only ac-
quire more know-how and information from these scientists but also benefit from their 
positional capital.  According to Lin (2003), the positional capital of social ties can be 
more useful than human capital because it not only evokes “the resources embedded in 
positions in the organization, but also the power, wealth, and reputation of the organiza-
tion itself."  
In this context, the university with which the scientists are affiliated represents an 
invaluable asset. A prestigious university tends to have the best faculty, students, instru-
ments and equipment and to generate new ideas and innovations.  It is believed that more 
eminent universities or researchers produce higher quality technology that is more worthy 
of funding and that the alumni can get more prestigious jobs in which they then construct 
valuable social ties. All these attributes enable these universities to procure funding and 
support from both public and private sources. As a result of their increased economic and 
political resources, they are wealthier, and thus better able to invest in research and attract 
human resources, all of which builds a positive feedback loop. Thus, even if two scien-
tists are equally knowledgeable and have the same research productivity, they possess 
different positional capital if they are in universities with clearly different reputations.  
Correspondingly, working with scientists from prestigious universities provides 
more opportunities for a firm to access university resources, including instruments and 
students, both of which are helpful in improving a firm’s research capabilities.  Further-
more, the current reputation of the academic institutions with which scientists are affili-
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ated affects their reputation in their fields of study (Long, Bowers et al. 1998; Cable and 
Murray 1999), which in turn adds to their firms’ perceived development potential through 
collaboration.  
H7:  NNBFs linked to universities with a higher reputation tend to have more re-
search output. 
H8:  NNBFs linked to universities with a higher reputation are more likely to 
have higher perceived technology potential. 
H9:  NNBFs linked to universities with a higher reputation are more likely to 
have higher external investment potential. 
University reputation is measured by a national ranking reported by the U.S. News 
and World Report, which publishes the mostly widely accepted ranking of universities 
and colleges. Universities often cite the ranking when they report their prestigiousness 
and progress. Among the various rankings provided by the U.S. News and World Report, 
the list of the best national universities is used as a measurement since it reflects the rec-
ognition of the university both inside and outside of the scientific community.  
 
4.5 Summary 
To summarize, this chapter proposes research framework and hypotheses and ex-
plains measurements of dependent and independent variables. With regard to dependent 
variables, research output is measured by the number of patents granted to the firm, per-
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ceived technology potential is measured by the value of SBIR/STTR awards received by 
the firm, and perceived investment potential is measured by venture capital invested on 
the firm. In terms of independent variables, research productivity is determined by the 
publication rate of a university scientist, network size is measured by the number of col-
laborators of the scientist, and university reputation is indicated by the national ranking. 










Figure 4.2   Research model  
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CHAPTER 5: SAMPLING STRATEGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
This chapter begins by introducing a sample collection strategy, including data 
sources, criteria for identifying NNBFs, and the selection process, and it is followed by 
three sections that describe dependent variables, network ties, and independent variables. 
Each section explains data sources, collection processes, and data distribution patterns.   
 
5.1 Sample collection 
The analysis is conducted on a sample of NNBFs, as described in Chapter 2. The 
partial list of NNBFs came from a nanotechnology firm directory provided by the Nano 
Science and Technology Institute (NSTI) (website: www.nsti.org). NSTI was founded in 
1997 as a result of the merging of several scientific societies that promote nanotechnol-
ogy and integrate it with other advanced technologies.  The institute maintains a database 
of more than 3,000 firms and organizations that conduct R&D or business in the field of 
nanotechnology.  Additional firms were obtained from the directories provided by two 
other main databases of nanotechnology firms: the International Nanotechnology Busi-
ness Directory (website: www.nanovip.com) and the International Small Technology 
Network (website: www.nanotechnology.com).  The final list for this study contained 
around four thousand firms. 
From this list, NNBFs were identified by a manual check of the product portfolios 
and company histories and backgrounds for all 4,000 firms from their websites and press 
releases. A firm is qualified as an NNBF if it was an independent entity, established 
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based on nanotechnology or a related technology or product, and still in business by the 
time this search was complete (May 2006).  Eleven firms were found to have changed 
their names and were listed under their current names as well as their original names, 
which were then removed from the list. As a result, 244 NNBFs were identified. 
Since most of the websites of the NNBFs do not provide complete information of 
their profiles (e.g., address, size, number of employees, net sales, the founding year, and 
founder information) these data had to be obtained from other sources. As mentioned be-
fore, NNBFs are mostly young and small, so they are not covered by the primary sources 
of the company directory.  The main databases used to search for information about the 
NNBFs were Dun & Bradstreet, CorpTech, and Plunkett.  Containing over 100 million 
business records and covering 132 NNBFs, Dun & Bradstreet is the most comprehensive 
of the sites (website: www.dnb.com). CorpTech, specifically targeting high tech indus-
tries and profiling more than 95,000 companies (website: www.corptech.com), was the 
source for 89 NNBFs. Plunkett, which does market research and industry analysis, is 
among the few databases that have a separate category for nanotechnology companies 
(website: www.plunkettresearch.com). The category “Nanotechnology and MEMs Indus-
try Companies” covers 316 firms, including 40 NNBFs.  
In addition to the above websites, several other sources including Reference USA 
(website: www.referenceusa.com), Hoovers (website: www.hoovers.com), and Thomas-
Net (website: www.thomasnet.com), were accessed for information. Although these da-
tabases contain information mainly about established, large, or public companies, they do 
provide additional information about a few NNBFs. A search for information about the 
firms that had changed their names was conducted in databases with both the new and old 
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names. After the search, basic firm information was still missing for 14 of the 244 
NNBFs, so they were dropped from the following analysis.  Thus, the final sample is 
comprised of 230 NNBFs. 
In addition to basic firm information, other data related with dependent and inde-
pendent variables need to be collected from various other sources for these NNBFs, 
which is explained below.  
 
5.2 Dependent variables:   innovation output and research credibility 
The hypotheses in Chapter 4 proposed three dependent variables:  innovation ca-
pability, perceived technology potential, and external investment potential.  
 
5.2.1 Innovation capability 
5.2.1.1 Patents 
 As mentioned by the NSF (2004), in the U.S., unless inventors are self-employed 
or independent, they generally assign ownership of their patents to their employers. 
Hence, the number of patents granted to an NNBF is a good indicator of technology in-
novation and invention activities in a firm. Since this study focuses on NNBFs in the 
United States, in which the domestic market is most important, only patents granted by 
the USPTO are taken into account.  In addition, in order to reduce variations in quality 
across applications, patent grants are used instead of patent applications.   The date of the 
patent application is recorded for each patent grant because it better indicates the time 
when a technology is invented.  
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5.2.1.2 Data description 
Among the 230 NNBFs, 122 firms had patent activities by 2005. As shown in 
Figure 5.1, 200 firms have no more than eleven patents and only three have over 50 pat-
ents. The maximum number of patents awarded to an NNBF was 232.5  Together, the 
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Figure 5.1   Frequency distribution of assigned patents 
 
                                                 
5 The number of assigned patents presented here is different from the number presented Chapter III, which 
is due to different search strategies. In Chapter 3, the number of patents was searched using a set of 
nanotechnology keywords while patent statistics presented here refer to the total amount of patents as-
signed to the firm, which includes but does not limit to patents retrieved with nano keywords.  
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5.2.2 Perceived technology potential 
5.2.2.1 Federal funding 
To provide R&D funds to small businesses with no more than 500 employees, the 
federal government has established the SBIR and STTR Programs. The SBIR program, 
established in 1982, provides funds for small businesses at their startup and development 
stages and enables them to compete with larger businesses.  The program is most helpful 
to firms with a high degree of technical and market uncertainty since they are less likely 
to obtain private funds (Toole and Czarnitzki 2005).  The SBIR requires ten agencies to 
reserve R&D funds for small business:  the DOA, the DOC, the DOD, the ED, the DOE, 
the DHHS, the DOT, the EPA, NASA, and the NSF.  The STTR, established in 1992, 
emphasizes the public-private sector partnership and supports joint venture opportunities 
for small businesses and the nation's premier nonprofit research institutions.  This pro-
gram requires five federal departments and agencies to reserve a portion of their R&D 
funds for small business-nonprofit research institution partnerships:  the DOD, the DOE, 
the DHHS, NASA, and the NSF. 
Information on the amounts of the SBIR/STTR award to small businesses is pub-
licly available via the gateway Tech-Net (Link: tech-net.sba.gov), a search engine that 
provides information and resources about and for small high-tech businesses. The system 
provides information on a firm’s name, state, zip code, ownership, principle investigator, 
keywords, phase applications, and so forth.  A firm starts with a Phase 1 application and 
if the scientific and technical merit and feasibility of the idea is acknowledged, it can be 
awarded up to $100,000.  The recipients of a Phase 1 award are eligible for a Phase 2 
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award, which can net the company up to $750,000 to further develop the idea (Wallsten 
2000).  As a part of this study, awards information for each firm was obtained in January 
2007.   
5.2.2.2 Data description 
After the search in the above system of the 230 NNBFs by their firm names, 141 
were found to have been awarded SBIR/STTR in Phase 1 and 93 succeeded in Phase 2.  
In Phase 1, the 141 firms received a total of 1,854 awards. The number of awards re-
ceived by firms is highly skewed toward the right (Figure 5.2). Three firms received over 
100 awards, 36 firms at least 10 awards, (but fewer than 100), a majority (191 firms) 
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Figure 5.2   Frequency distribution of SBIR/STTR awards in Phase 1 
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The number of awards in Phase 2 was 579, less than one-third the number in 
Phase 1. Nineteen firms had at least ten Phase 2 awards and the maximum number was 
76. One hundred and ninety-six firms received fewer than four awards in Phase 2, with 
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Figure 5.3   Frequency distribution of SBIR/STTR awards in Phase 2 
 
On average, 27 percent of the awards in Phase 1 successfully moved into Phase 2.  
As shown in Table 5.1, 48 firms that had been granted Phase 1 awards failed to enter 
Phase 2. In the remaining 93 firms, around half managed to receive an average of 29 per-
cent of Phase 1 awards renewed in Phase 2. Nine firms achieved a 100 percent success 
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rate in renewing Phase 1 awards. However, none of these nine firms had more than three 
awards in phase 1. 
 
Table 5.1   Success rate of Phase 1 awards in Phase 2 
Success Rate Number of Firms (total 141) 
0 48 
0< and <=25% 27 
25%< and <=50% 46 
50%< and <=75% 11 
75%< and <100% 0 
100% 9 
 
The value of the SBIR/STTR awards is even more skewed to a small number of 
firms. The overall value of SBIR/STTR Phase 1 awards to NNBFs is $268 million. The 
left-most bar in Figure 5.4 shows that 168 firms received less than $1.08 million in 
SBIR/STTR Phase 1 awards. Four firms received awards worth over $10 million, and the 
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Figure 5.4   Frequency distribution of value of SBIR/STTR Phase 1 awards 
 
Although fewer awards were conferred in Phase 2 than in Phase 1 (579 and 1,854, 
respectively), the value of the Phase 2 awards was much larger. The total value of awards 
was $268 million in Phase 1 and $608 million in Phase 2. Considering that the number of 
awardees in Phase 2 was only 66 percent of that in Phase 1, the funding received by each 
firm was substantial. Whereas the average award received by each firm in Phase 1 was 
$1.9 million, it was $6.5 million in Phase 2. In Phase 2, 15 firms awarded over $10 mil-
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Figure 5.5   Frequency distribution of the value of SBIR/STTR Phase 2 awards 
 
5.2.3 External investment potential 
5.2.3.1 Venture capital 
Data on venture capital investment was obtained from PricewaterhouseCoopers / 
Thomson Venture Economics / National Venture Capital Association MoneyTree(tm) 
Survey (Link: https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/index.jsp). The MoneyTree 
Report is a quarterly study of venture capital investment published by Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers and the National Venture Capital Association using data from Thomson Finan-
cial, who surveys venture capital practioners on a quarterly base. The report provides in-
formation from 1995 to present on cash-for-equity venture capital (VC) investment in the 
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U.S. The database contains information about the amount of VC investment and the 
number of VC deals by region, industry, investee firms, investors, and investment stages. 
Each NNBF was searched in the database using the firm name in January 2007. 
5.2.3.2 Data description 
The search of 230 firms in the MoneyTree Report database produced only 60 
firms with VC investment activities since 1995. The total VC investment in these NNBFs 
was $1.3 billion, more than the sum of SBIR/STTR Phase 1 and Phase 2 awards, which 
was $876 million. Therefore, although VC funding does not have as broad coverage as 
government funding, it is plays a significant role in the financing of NNBFs. Among the 
60 firms receiving VC investments, 184 firms receive less than $5 million in VC invest-
ment as indicated by the left bar in Figure 5.6. Six firms receive over $50 million, ac-
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Figure 5.6   Frequency distribution of the value of venture capital 
 
 
5.3  Tie between NNBFs and universities:   co-authored publications 
5.3.1  Data collection 
Publication information is found in the nanotechnology publication database de-
veloped by the CNS-ASU Georgia Tech team. This database contains 105,068 publica-
tion records, from 1990 to 2006, retrieved from the SCI using a set of nanotechnology 
keywords. SCI is the most well-accepted international publication database, covering 
around 6,000 scientific journals and 170 scientific disciplines. It constitutes the core of 
international scientific journals with certain quality (Moed, Burger et al. 1985). However, 
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the use of SCI as a source of publication data has its limitation since many journals in 
engineering sciences are not covered by SCI. Therefore, research activities revealed by 
SCI publications show biases towards basic sciences (Moed and van Leeuwen 1995). 
Nevertheless, it is the most extensive bibliometric database and until recently the only 
database that carries reference and citation information6 (Bar-Ilan, Levene et al. 2007). 
Information provided by this database includes article titles, journal names, authors, af-
filiations, and so forth.  
The search for co-publications of firms and university scientists began with a 
search for all the publications of a firm. As SCI does not present the full name of affilia-
tions, variations in the abbreviation of the firm name were noted. As a result of this 
search, 114 of the 230 NNBFs were found to have published in 1996-2005, with a total 
number of publications of 620.  The number of publications by each firm varied between 
0 and 45, and 16 firms had at least 10 publications (Figure 5.7).  
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Figure 5.7   Frequency distribution of publications  
 
The next step was to create a sub-set of publications that had co-authors from uni-
versities, which resulted in 334 publications from 85 firms. Scientists from approximately 
a hundred universities collaborated with the 85 NNBFs to co-author publications. The 
most active firm had 23 co-authored publications with university scientists and 22 publi-
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Figure 5.8   Frequency distribution of co-publications with university scientists 
 
To measure the resources associated with university scientists that could produce 
spillover to NNBFs, the most critical step was to identify the university scientists and 
their affiliations.  However, the names of publication authors could not be easily found 
since the SCI published only the last name and the initial of the first name of each author. 
Furthermore, in downloaded records, author names and affiliations were placed in two 
separate categories, with no one-to-one match between author names and affiliations, 
which caused problems for this study. In general, authors with the same last name, the 
same initials of the first and middle names (if there were any), and affiliations with the 
same institution, were regarded as the same person. However, since scientists frequently 
move from one institution to another, it was difficult to determine whether the same ab-
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breviations of authors from different affiliations referred to the same person. In addition, 
names appearing in publications might vary because the initials of middle names are 
omitted in some publications while included in others. 
The names were checked against the journal article to ensure accuracy.  Journal 
articles were located using the citation information obtained from the publication data-
base mentioned above. In most journal articles, the full names and affiliations of the au-
thors are provided. However, a few journals print only the last name and initials. Never-
theless, each name is associated with an affiliation. In this case, the abbreviated name 
was matched with the full name if they were affiliated with the same institution. Other-
wise, given the affiliation information, abbreviated names were searched in their affilia-
tions to determine the full names. 
In addition, people with the same full name but different affiliations were not 
treated as the same person by default. Instead, I visited the website hosting the author’s 
information for verification. This study is targeting university scientists, most of whom 
have their CV, employment history, and publication records published online. Therefore, 
in the case of the same abbreviated names but different affiliations, they were treated as 
the same person only when affiliations matched the author’s work experience. See Figure 
5.9 for the flowchart of the data collection process and some basic statistics. 
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Figure 5.9   Flowchart of data collection process 
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5.3.2 Data description 
With this method, 749 university scientists from over 90 universities were identi-
fied as having co-authored publications with NNBFs and 27 had co-authorship with more 
than one NNBF. Ten percent of university scientists were found to have multiple affilia-
tions in this publication database. In particular, 54 university scientists were employed in 
both universities and NNBFs.  Some of them were the founders of the NNBFs and either 
stayed at the universities after founding the NNBFs or left the universities to work full-
time in the firms.   
The 749 university scientists who had co-authored publications with NNBFs con-
tributed a total of about 5,800 publications on nanotechnology. Fifteen of them had over 
100 publications in the past fifteen years, but more than 60 percent had fewer than ten 
publications on nanotechnology (Figure 5.10). Half of those who had fewer than ten pub-
lications had entered the field only recently, with less than five years’ publication history 
(Figure 5.11). As shown in Table 5.2, scientists who had more work experience in this 
field tended to have more publications. Among the 749 scientists, half were senior re-
searchers with over eight years of work experience, while one-third of them were new 
comers, mostly graduate students who worked on projects together with their advisors 
and whose names appeared on these publications. However, their contribution is not as 
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Figure 5.11   Frequency distribution of years of experience of university scientists 
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Table 5.2   Crosstable of publications and years of experience 
Number of publications Years of experience Total 
 1-4 (p25) 5-7 (p50) 8-12 (p75) 13-17  
1-2 (25th percentile) 
155 42 17 0 214
3-6 (50th percentile) 
61 60 34 6 161
7-20(75th percentile) 
24 66 80 26 196
20-308 
0 5 47 126 178
Total 
240 173 178 158 749
 
 
5.4 Independent variables: research productivity, network size, and university repu-
tation 
5.4.1 Research productivity 
Research productivity, as measured by the number of publications per year, varies 
largely among scientists, ranging from 0.1 to 18.12. On average, 331 scientists have less 
than one publication per year, 412 scientists have at least one publication but fewer than 
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Figure 5.12   Frequency distribution of the research productivity of university scien-
tists 
 
5.4.2 Network size 
Among the 749 university scientists in this sample, 363 have fewer than 20 col-
laborators with whom they publish (Figure 5.13), 57 scientists have at least 100 collabo-
rators, and 17 scientists work and publish with more than 200 researchers. As in most 
cases of collaboration between NNBFs and universities, the university teams are led by a 
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Figure 5.13   Frequency distribution of network size of university scientists 
 
5.4.3 University reputation 
Since the ranking of universities doesn’t change significantly from year to year 
(Table 5.3), the year 2000, the median year in the time frame between 1996 and 2005, 
was chosen as the reference year. The complete lists of Tier 1 universities in 1996, 2000, 
and 2005 are presented in Appendix A1-3. Thirty-four Tier 1 universities were found to 
have collaborative activities with NNBFs between 1996 and 2005.   
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Table 5.3   Top ten Tier 1 universities in 2000 and their ranking in 1996 and 2005 
Top 10 in 2000 Rank in 2000 Rank in 1996 Rank in 2005
Princeton University (NJ)  1 2 1
Harvard University (MA)  2 3 1
Yale University (CT)  2 1 3
California Institute of Technology (CA) 4 9 7
Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MA) 5 5 7
Stanford University (CA)  6 6 5
University of Pennsylvania (PA)  6 13 4
Duke University (NC)  8 4 5
Dartmouth College (NH)  9 7 9
Columbia University (NY)  10 11 9
Cornell University (NY)  10 14 13
University of Chicago (IL) 10 12 15
 
Among the 797 scientists who collaborated with NNBFs, 318 came from universi-
ties listed as Tier 1 universities in U.S. New and World Report in 2000 (Figure 5.14).  
Rank zero in Figure 6.14 refers to all universities that are not in Tier 1. The most active 
collaborators with NNBFs were the following four universities, each with over 30 scien-
tists: the University of Michigan (35), the Massachussets Institute of Technology (27), 






















0 10 20 30 40 50
Rank of the scientist's university
 
Figure 5.14   Frequency distribution of university ranking of university scientists 
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CHAPTER 6: VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION AND MODEL 
SPECIFICATION 
 
This chapter describes the final dataset and explains the coding of variables. It 
continues by presenting the statistical distribution of variables and then proposes different 
econometric models. The assumption and applicability of each model in this dataset is 
discussed. The chapter ends by presenting the regression output of each model. 
 
6.1 Variable coding and description 
This study uses a longitudinal dataset 7  that contains information about 230 
NNBFs between 1996 and 2005 – 2,300 observations. However, since many of the 
NNBFs were not founded until near the end of last century, values were reported as miss-
ing for years before the firm was founded, which resulted in unbalanced panel data with 
1,539 observations. Table 6.1 describes the participation pattern of this panel dataset, 
which shows that 230 firms (n=230) are included in this dataset and distributed over ten 
years (t=10) 1996-2005. The participation pattern is shown on the right side of the table, 
where a “1” indicates one observation in that year and a dot (.) indicates no observation 
that year (STATA 2005). The largest fraction of the firms, 27.83 percent of the total, can 
                                                 
7 A two-period model was considered for this study. Instead of using cross-sectional time series models, 
efforts have been made to construct the data into two time periods, such as 2000-2002/2003-2005. That is, 
only firms established in 2000-2002 (T1) are taken as the object of the study, and their activities such as 
patenting, SBIR/STTR awards, and VC investment in 2003-2005 (T2) are examined. Eighty-one firms 
were founded in T1. However, only 8 firms collaborated with universities in T1. A different set of T1 and 
T2 with 1998-2001/2002-2005 ended with 10 firms in T1 that collaborated with universities. Therefore, the 
variance in these data is not big enough to render the models significant.   
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be seen in all ten years, followed by 14.35 percent of the firms, which can be seen after 
2000.  Eight percent of the firms were observed only in 2004 and 2005. The statistical 
software STATA (version 9.2) was used for analysis throughout this chapter. 
 
Table 6.1   Description of participation pattern of panel dataset 
. xtdes, i(id) t(year) 
 
      id:  6, 8, ..., 303                                    n =        230 
    year:  1996, 1997, ..., 2005                             T =         10 
 
     Freq.  Percent    Cum. |  Pattern 
 ---------------------------+------------ 
       64     27.83   27.83 |  1111111111 
       33     14.35   42.17 |  ....111111 
       31     13.48   55.65 |  .....11111 
       19      8.26   63.91 |  ........11 
       17      7.39   71.30 |  ......1111 
       17      7.39   78.70 |  ...1111111 
       16      6.96   85.65 |  .......111 
       16      6.96   92.61 |  ..11111111 
       16      6.96   99.57 |  .111111111 
        1      0.43  100.00 | (other patterns) 
 ---------------------------+------------ 
      230    100.00         |  XXXXXXXXXX 
 
Table 6.2 presents the variables created for this model and their definitions. Vari-
able Patent i t is the number of patents assigned to firm i (i = 1, …, 230) by the USPTO 
and  applied in year t (t = 1990, …, 2005).  If the firm was founded in 1998, the variable 
Patent was coded as a missing value in 1996-1997. The same rule applies to other firm 
level variables. Variables SBIRfirst it and SBIRsecond it are the number of SBIR/STTR 
awards in million dollar values assigned to firm i in year t, respectively.  If the firm re-
ceived more than one award in a particular year, the values of the awards were summed. 
Variable VC it is the amount of venture capital in million dollar values invested in firm i 
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in year t. Since 68 percent of observations (firm-year) have zero-value for SBIRfirst, 82 
percent for SBIRsecond, and 90 percent for VC, these three variables are not put into a log 
format. 
 
Table 6.2   Variable description 
Variable Type Description 
Patent it Count  The number of granted patents applied by firm i in 
year t 
SBIRfirst it Interval SBIR/STTR grants in Phase 1 assigned to firm i in 
year t (in million $) 
SBIRsecond it Interval SBIR/STTR grants in Phase 2 assigned to firm i in 
year t (in million $) 
VC it Interval Venture capital investment received by firm i in 
year t (in million $) 
Collaboration it Count The number of co-authored publications with uni-
versity scientists by firm i by year t 
Productivity it Count The number of highly productive university scien-
tists tied to firm i by year t 
Network it Count The number of highly collaborative university sci-
entists tied to firm i by year t 
Reputation it Count The number of Tier 1 universities tied to firm i by 
year t 
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Table 6.2 continued 
Firmage it Interval Age of firm i in year t 
SBIRdummy i Dummy Whether firm i has received any SBIR/STTR 
awards: 1 for yes and 0 for no 
Ownership i Dummy Whether firm i is a private firm: 1 for yes and 0 for 
no 
Univspinoff i Dummy Whether firm i is a spin-off from a university: 1 for 
yes and 0 for no 
Nanomaterial i Dummy 
Whether firm i works in the field of nanomaterials: 
1 for yes and 0 for no 
Nanobiotech i Dummy 
Whether firm i works in the field of nanobiotech-
nology: 1 for yes and 0 for no 
Nanoelectro i Dummy 
Whether firm i works in the field of nanoelectronics 
or nanoinstruments: 1 for yes and 0 for no 
Otherfield i Dummy 
Whether firm i works in other fields of nanotech-
nology: 1 for yes and 0 for no 
CA i Dummy Whether firm i is located in California: 1 for yes 
and 0 for no 
MA i Dummy Whether firm i is located in Massachusetts: 1 for 
yes and 0 for no 
 
The connection between NNBFs and university scientists is assumed to begin 
with their first collaboration, or the first publication co-authored by both sides, and to 
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continue in the following years, even if they do not co-author a publication. Although a 
co-publication clearly shows collaboration, lack of a co-publication does not necessarily 
indicate a lack of collaborative activity. Furthermore, as long as a network tie has been 
built between a firm and a university scientist, informal exchange or resource spillover 
takes place without formal research collaboration. Thus, the resources of a university sci-
entist were added to those of the firm starting from the first year of their collaboration 
and then applied to the following years. This rule applies to three variables of university 
and university scientists: Productivity it, Network it, and Reputation it. 
Variable Productivity it was coded as the number of highly productive university 
scientists who had co-publications with firm i by year t. Research productivity of an indi-
vidual scientist is the annual number of publications, calculated as the total number of 
publications divided by the length of his or her scientific career. Highly productive scien-
tists are those above the 75th percentile. According to Table 6.3, scientists who have at 
least 2.06 publications every year are labeled as highly productive scientists in this study.  
 
Table 6.3   Distribution of university scientists’ attributes (N=749) 
 Mean Min Max p25 p50 p75 
The number of publications per year 1.68 0.1 18.12 0.5 1 2.06
The number of collaborators 37.33 2 386 11 20 46
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According to these criteria, 200 out of 749 scientists were highly productive. 
Sixty-five firms were found to have collaborated with these highly productive scientists 
(Table 6.4). While one firm worked with 20 highly productive scientists, most of the oth-
ers (29 firms) worked with only one collaborator who was highly productive. 
Similarly, variable Network it indicates the number of highly collaborative univer-
sity scientists who had collaborated with firm i by year t.  The variable is measured by the 
number of collaborators that the scientists had in their scientific community,  identified 
by counting the co-authorships on their publications. Again, using the 75th percentile cri-
teria, scientists who had at least 46 collaborators are considered highly collaborative sci-
entists (Table 6.3), which comprises 26 percent of all university scientists in this sample. 
As shown in Table 6.4, 66 firms worked with these collaborative scientists. Among them, 
27 firms (41 percent) were tied to only one highly collaborative scientist and three-
quarters of the firms collaborated with three or fewer highly collaborative scientists. 
Variable Reputation it is the number of Tier 1 universities that collaborated with 
firm i by year t. The list of Tier 1 universities was obtained from the U.S. News and 
World Report ranking of 2000, as described in Chapter 5. Thirty-four of the 51 Tier 1 
universities had research connections with NNBFs between 1996 and 2005, and 53 of the 
230 NNBFs worked with at least one Tier 1 university.  One firm had a connection with 
eight Tier 1 universities (Table 6.4). 
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Table 6.4   Distribution of variables Productivity, Network, and Reputation (N=230) 
 Mean Min Max 
Productivity 0.813 0 (n=165) 20 (n=1)
Network 0.826 0 (n=164) 22 (n=1)
Reputation 0.378 0 (n=177) 8 (n=1)
 
Several variables were used to control other factors that might affect a firm’s re-
search performance and perceived potential. The control variable Firmage it measures the 
number of years that firm i had been running until year t.  In general, firms with a longer 
history have more resources and experience that they can benefit from. The variable 
Ownership i shows whether firm i is public or private. Public firms have different financ-
ing behavior, so their funding sources are different from those of private firms. Variable 
Univspinoff i shows the origin of the firm.  Firms that are spin-offs from universities have 
many more ties to the hosting universities and universities scientists than firms that are 
not.  Such connections cannot be captured entirely by research collaboration that leads to 
co-authored publications. The variables Nanomaterial i, Nanobiotechnology i, Nanoelec-
tro i and Otherfield i are four dummy variables that represent the field in which firm i 
works. These field dummy variables are used to control the effect of the differing patent-
ing behavior of firms in the various technical fields, which might have different priorities 
when they make grant and investment decisions. Variable CA i and variable MA i are two 
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dummy variables showing whether firm i is located in these strongly entrepreneurial re-
gions.  
Table 6.5 presents the descriptive statistics of these variables. All the variables 
have 1,539 observations for the 230 firms from 1996 to 2005.  To illustrate them more 
clearly, Table 6.4 shows the statistics of the 230 firms for the entire ten-year period, 
while Table 6.5 presents the statistics for the 230 firms by year. 
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Table 6.5   Descriptive statistics of variables (obs = 1539) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Patent it 0.804 2.931 0 51
SBIRfirst it 0.095 0.231 0 2.6
SBIRsecond it 0.219 0.715 0 11
VC it 0.855 3.737 0 40
Collaboration it 0.669 2.189 0 23
Productivity it 0.415 1.389 0 20
Network it 0.452 1.483 0 22
Reputation it 0.177 0.696 0 8
Firmage it 6.182 4.881 1 25
Ownership i 0.945 0.227 0 1
Univspin i 0.528 0.499 0 1
Nanomaterial i 0.442 0.497 0 1
Nanobiotech i 0.213 0.410 0 1
Nanoelectro i 0.285 0.451 0 1
CA i 0.181 0.385 0 1
MA i 0.112 0.316 0 51
 
 
6.2  Dependent variables:  distribution and comparison 
Before examining the impact of the various resources of university scientists on 
NNBFs through collaboration, a statistical test is conducted to show any differences be-
tween the performance of firms that cooperate with university scientists and the perform-
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ance of those that do not.  That is, only when firms that collaborated with universities 
performed differently (i.e., better within the context of this study), from those that did 
not, was there a need to explore the factors that contributed to the difference. Although 
none of the dependent variables has normally distributed mean (Table 6.6 and Figures 
6.1-6.4), given the fact that the test is done in a large sample, a t test still generates valid 
statistics in a comparison between the two groups.  
 
Table 6.6   Test of normality 8 
. sktest patent SBIRfirst SBIRsecond vc 
 
                   Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                 ------- joint ------ 
    Variable |  Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
      patent |      0.000         0.000               .            . 
   SBIRfirst |      0.000         0.000               .            . 
  SBIRsecond |      0.000         0.000               .            . 
          vc |      0.000         0.000               .             
 
                                                 
8 The normality of these variables was tested based on their skewness and kurtosis.  Skewness measures the 
deviation of the distribution from symmetry, and kurtosis measures the peakedness of the distribution com-
pared with the normal distribution. For a standard normal distribution, skewness is zero and kurtosis is 
three. Table 6.6 presents the results of the normality test, where skewness and kurtosis both strongly reject 
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Figure 6.4   Frequency distribution of the variable VC 
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A dummy variable Coopdummy was created to differentiate two groups of firms. 
It was coded as 1 for firms that had collaborated with university scientists and as 0 for 
firms that had not collaborated with university scientists.  In the sample, 85 firms had re-
search collaboration with universities, while 145 firms did not. The results in Table 6.7 
show the means of these two groups and the t-values of the test on the difference in the 
means.  
 
Table 6.7   T-test on dependent variables (N=230) 

























a.   The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
b.   ***indicates a significance level of 1%. 
**indicates a significance level of 5%. 
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The t-test compares the means of the firms not collaborating with universities (the 
group on the left) with the means of firms collaborating with universities (the group on 
the right). The null hypothesis signifies no difference in the means between these two 
groups. This hypothesis is strongly rejected in testing the means of all four dependent 
variables:  Patent, SBIRfirst, SBIRsecond, and VC.  In addition, the t-value—the differ-
ence between the left group and the right group—is negative for all these four variables, 
indicating that the means of the left group is smaller than that of the right group. In other 
words, firms not collaborating with universities did not perform as well as those working 
with universities in the measures of patents, SBIR, and VC. However, the t-test doesn’t 
suggest the casual-effect relationship between collaboration and firm performance. The 
positive correlation might also come from assortive selection, which is, firms performing 
well are more willing to collaborate with university scientists. More analysis is needed to 
differentiate between the causal interpretation and assortive selection. 
In the remainder of this chapter, two sets of models are used to test the effects of 
having research collaborate with university scientists on firm performance:  Model 1 uses 
the variable Collaboration to test the overall impact of collaboration with universities, 
and Model 2 uses three the variables Productivity, Network, and Reputation to test the 
special impact of the various attributes of university scientists. 
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6.3 Model specification 
6.3.1 Models on the variable Patent 
The variable Patent is a count variable with a large number of zero values. Both 
the Poisson model and the negative binomial model were specifically designed for count 
outcomes (Long and Freese 2001). The Poisson distribution is the basis for the Poisson 






   for y = 0, 1, 2, …                                              (Equation 6.1) 
As µ increases, the odds of zero counts decrease, and the Poisson distribution gets 
close to the normal distribution. The Poisson distribution is restricted by the assumption 
that the mean of the dependent variable equals the variance of the dependent variable:  
Var (y) = µ. By contrast, the negative binomial model is not restricted by Poisson distri-
bution assumptions and provides unbiased estimates, even with overdispersion. The nega-
tive binomial model has the same mean structure as the Poisson model, but it adds an er-
ror term that is uncorrelated with the independent variables: | , ~ ( ( | ))i i i i i iy x c Po c E y x
2 )
 
where ~ (1,ic Gamma η  and ci independent of xi. If overdispersion exists ( ), 
compared with the negative binomial model, the standard errors in the Poisson model 
have larger z-values and smaller p-values (Long and Freeze 2001). 
2 0η >
Therefore, the negative binomial model is preferred in this case, while the results 
of the OLS and Poisson models are also provided for the purpose of comparison. The 
fixed effects regression method is used to control the firm effects on the independent 
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variables. In the case of OLS, the robust option is used to produce estimators that are ro-
bust to possible heteroskedasticity, or inconstant variance in the regression error term. 
 
Table 6.8   Regression output on the variable Patentt (1996-2005) 
Number of observations = 2539 
Number of groups = 230 
 OLS FE Poisson FE NBRE FE 






























































Table 6.8 continued 
Nanoelectro 

















F 6.90*** 5.48***  
Wald chi2(9)  75.09*** 92.50*** 16.27* 24.83***
a.   The numbers in parentheses are standard errors (robust standard errors for GLS). 
b.   ***indicates a significance level of 1%. 
**indicates a significance level of 5%. 
*indicates a significance level of 10%. 
 
In Model 1, the variable Collaboration is found to have a positive impact on a 
firm’s patenting activities (Table 6.8).  Firms collaborating with universities tend to have 
more patents. However, this effect is not statistically significant, so no conclusions about 
the population could be generated from this sample.  
The three attributes of university scientists in Model 2 exhibit different effects on 
their collaborating firms.  The variable Productivity has a negative impact on the depend-
ent variable Patent. The impact is not significant in the OLS regression, but significant in 
both the Poisson and NBRE regressions. This result shows that the research attitude to-
ward publications and patents is different in that, scientists who are productive in publica-
tions tend to be less active in patenting.  The variable Network has positive coefficients in 
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all three regressions of OLS, Poisson, and NBRE, and the coefficients of the latter two 
regressions are significant.  This finding provides evidence of  the contribution of social 
capital of university scientists to firms through their collaboration. The coefficient of the 
variable Reputation is inconsistent across the three models and not significant.  
Among the control variables that are statistically significant, the sign of the vari-
able Firmage is consistently negative and significant, suggesting that firms are more 
likely to patent their inventions in early years. After all, many high tech firms are estab-
lished based on an acquisition of IPRs, but as a firm progresses, emphasis is placed on the 
improvement and development of technology and products. In the NBRE model, the 
variables Nanomaterial and Nanobiotech are found to have positive and significant coef-
ficients, suggesting that firms working in the fields of nanomaterials and nanobiotech 
have more patents than those working in other fields.  
In addition to OLS, Poisson and NBRE, the variable Patent is also tested on the 
zero-inflated model since it has excess zeros. The zero-inflated model generates two 
separate models: a binary process and a count process, and then combines them together 
(Long and Freeze 2001). In the binary process, a logit model is generated to predict 
whether the observation (firm i in year t) belongs to the always zero (patent) group. In the 
count process, a Poisson or NBRE model is generated to predict the number of patents for 
observations that are not in the always zero group. However, currently there is no panel 
data command available to run the zero-inflated model in STATA. Therefore, the zero-
inflated model is tried using regular command and year dummies are incorporated to con-
trol for trend effects. Since this is not the optimal approach, the results only represent the 
rough relationship between independent variables and the dependent variable.  
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Table 6.9   Zero-inflated models on variable Patentt (1996-2005) 
Number of observations = 1539 
Nonzero observations = 396 
Zero observations = 1143 
 Model 1 Model 2 




























































































































































LR Chi2 623.25*** 654.02*** 
Log likelihood -1697.198 -1669.293 
a.   The numbers in parentheses are standard errors (robust standard errors for OLS). 
b.   ***indicates a significance level of 1%. 
**indicates a significance level of 5%. 
*indicates a significance level of 10%. 
 
Table 6.9 shows the results of both the count model (Poisson) and the binary 
model (logit) generated by the zero-inflated Poisson model. To be noted, many variables 
have opposite directions of coefficients in the count and binary models since the binary 
model is predicting the possibility of being in the always zero group. Among the vari-
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ables that are statistically significant, the variable Collaboration has negative coefficient 
in the logit model in Model 1. It shows that firms having collaboration with university 
scientists are less likely to have zero patents. In Model 2, the variable productivity is 
negatively associated with the number of patents assigned to the firm. The variable net-
work has a negative impact on the possibility of having no patents, and a positive impact 
on the number of patents. The variable reputation has positive coefficient on the number 
of patents. The results are consistent with those produced by panel data models (Table 
6.8). 
 
6.3.2 Models on the variables SBIRfirst and SBIRsecond 
Both variables SBIRfirst and SBIRsecond are non-negative interval variables with 
zero for a nontrivial fraction (Figures 6.2 and 6.3), which is a typical corner solution re-
sponse. The corner solution response occurs when a variable is continuously distributed 
over a large range of positive values but takes a certain value, usually zero, for a signifi-
cant fraction of the population.  In the case of corner solution responses, while a linear 
model still captures the expected values of estimators for xi near the mean value, it leads 
to negative predictions for some observations (Wooldridge 2003).  
By contrast, the Tobit model was specifically designed to model corner solution 
dependent variables (Ibid) and expresses an observed variable y with a latent variable y*, 
which satisfies the classic linear model assumptions. The observed variable y equals the 
latent variable y* when y* ≥ 0, and equals zero when y*<0 (Equation 6.2). Thus, the ob-
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served variable y has a continuous distribution over positive values with a greater fraction 
on zero while the latent variable y* is normally distributed. 
 
y = y* if y* ≥ 0 
y = 0 if y*<0 , Equation 6.2 
where ),0(~, 20
* σββ Normalxuuxy ++=  
No sufficient statistic allows a fixed-effects Tobit model, except in the case of an 
unconditional fixed-effects Tobit model with indicator variables for the panels, which 
generally provide biased estimators (STATA 2005). Hence, only the random-effects To-
bit model was applied here. In addition to the Tobit model, the linear regression model 
was also applied to test the variables using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method even 
though OLS doesn’t provide consistent estimators.  
The regression outputs of both the Tobit model and the OLS model are presented 
in Tables 6.10 and 6.11, respectively. In both models on the variables SBIRfirst and 
SBIRsecond, the Tobit coefficient estimates of the independent variables have the same 
sign as the corresponding OLS estimates, and the statistical significance of the estimates 
is similar. The variable Collaboration in Model 1 has a significant and positive impact on 
SBIRfirst and SBIRsecond in both models. Thus, collaboration with universities is helping 
firms obtain more SBIR/STTR awards from the government.  
In Model 2, the variable Productivity is significantly positive in both the OLS and 
Tobit regressions on the variables SBIRfirst and SBIRsecond, implying that the scientific 
merit of proposals is valued in SBIR/STTR awards. By contrast, the variable Network is 
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negatively associated with both the SBIRfirst and SBIRsecond variables.  The variable 
Reputation is positively associated with the variables SBIRfirst/SBIRsecond, but again the 
coefficient is not significant. 
Among the control variables that passed the significance test, Firmage is positive 
on both dependent variables, suggesting that the older a firm is, the more likely it can se-
cure awards because firms build their credibility over time.  The variable Univspin is 
negative on the variable SBIRsecond, which shows that firms that spin off from universi-
ties are less likely to secure awards from federal agencies, as firms whose founders are 
full-time professors may not be eligible for awards from the SBIR program while many 
university spin-offs whose founders are still affiliated with universities remain eligible.  
The variable Ownership is positive on both dependent variables since public firms are 
generally not qualified for SBIR/STTR awards.  The variable MA is positively correlated 
with the variable SBIRsecond, suggesting that firms in Massachusetts have some advan-
tage when applying for SBIR/STTR awards. In addition, the variable SBIRfirst is signifi-
cantly positively correlated with the variable SBIRsecond, suggesting that the value of 
SBIR/STTR awards in Phase 2 is positively dependent on the value in Phase 1.  
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Table 6.10   Regression output on the variable SBIRfirstt (1996-2005) 
Number of observations = 2539 
Number of groups = 230 
 OLS FE Tobit 























































Wald chi2 79.90*** 80.28***
a.   The numbers in parentheses are standard errors (robust standard errors for OLS). 
b.   ***indicates a significance level of 1%. 
**indicates a significance level of 5%. 
*indicates a significance level of 10%. 
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Table 6.11   Regression output on the variable SBIRsecondt (1996-2005) 
Number of observations = 2539 
Number of groups = 230 
 OLS FE Tobit 






























































Wald chi2 426.93*** 423.25***
a.   The numbers in parentheses are standard errors (robust standard errors for OLS). 
b.   ***indicates a significance level of 1%. 
**indicates a significance level of 5%. 
*indicates a significance level of 10%. 
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6.3.3 Models on the variable VC 
Similar to the variables SBIRfirst and SBIRsecond, the variable VC is tested in 
both OLS and Tobit regressions. The OLS and Tobit regression outputs are reported in 
Table 6.12.  The variable Collaboration in Model 1 is positive but not significantly corre-
lated with the dependent variable VC.  
In Model 2, the variable Productivity has a negative impact on the dependent 
variable while the variable Network is positively associated with the dependent variable. 
Both effects are statistically significant, indicating that the social capital of university sci-
entists contributes to a firm’s attractiveness to venture capital.  In contrast, the research 
productivity of scientists is less attractive in this aspect since venture capitalists place 
more value on the commercial and marketing capability of a firm in their investment de-
cisions. Again, the variable Reputation has no significant impact on the dependent vari-
able.  
In terms of the control variables, Univspin is consistently positive and significant 
across all the models. It seems that firms that spin off from universities are more likely to 
be trusted by venture capitalists.  The field variable Nanoelectro is negatively associated 
with the dependent variable and is significant in both models, suggesting that firms in the 
field of nanoelectronics are less favored by venture capitalists than those in other fields. 
Variable CA and variable MA are significantly positive in both models.  That is, the loca-
tion of a firm in California or Massachussets helps it to procure more venture capital in-
vestment since most VC companies are also located in these areas and find it easier to 
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manage their investments in nearby firms.  All the other control variables exhibit mixed 
and insignificant effects. 
 
Table 6.12   Regression output on the variable VCt (1996-2005) 
Number of observations = 2539 
Number of groups = 230 
 OLS FE Tobit 























































Wald chi2 23.11*** 33.55***
a.   The numbers in parentheses are standard errors (robust standard errors for OLS). 
b.   ***indicates a significance level of 1%. 
**indicates a significance level of 5%. 
*indicates a significance level of 10%. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter reviews the structure of this thesis and summarizes its methodology 
and main findings. The hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4 are evaluated using the regres-
sion results presented in Chapter 6.  It is followed by the discussion of the implications of 
this study for theory and policy. In the end, the chapter addresses the limitations of the 
study and presents recommendations for future study. 
 
7.1 Summary of the main findings 
This thesis reviews the development of nanotechnology and the nanotechnology 
industry, specifically with regard to NNBFs in the United States.  It describes R&D ac-
tivities in different sectors in the field of nanotechnology, in which university research 
shows its dominance, as it does in other knowledge-intensive industries. As universities 
move from Mode 1 to Mode 2, which is, from doing interest-driven research to problem-
driven research, the transition is not homogenous across fields. For example, research in 
fields of natural sciences such as mathematics, theoretical physics and astronomy is still 
largely in Mode 1. The advances in applied sciences including nanotechnology and others 
such as information and computer technology and biotechnology in fact propel the transi-
tion of the function of universities. Technological breakthroughs in these fields are of 
value to enterprises and can be applied to industrial products, which promotes the growth 
of high-tech industries. The development of high-tech enterprises creates a market for 
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knowledge generated in universities. Therefore, the involvement of university research in 
these high-tech industries is more active and visible.  
This thesis continues with an exploration of the impact of university research on 
NNBFs by examining resource spillover from universities to NNBFs via their collabora-
tion. The relationship under investigation in this study is mainly research collaboration 
between NNBFs and universities as reflected in co-authored publications. This connec-
tion shows a mixed, but positive effect on a firm’s research capability and development 
potential.  
As nanotechnology is still in its early stages of development, it has neither ma-
tured nor exhibited any clear applications for industry. The bulk of research is still carried 
out in universities. As shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6, 80 percent of overall nano- publica-
tions and half of industry publications between 1990 and 2005 were contributed by uni-
versity scientists. When firms collaborate with academic scientists, it facilitates the diffu-
sion of knowledge from universities to the firms, which enjoy an advantageous position 
in the marketplace, as they enjoy access to state-of-art knowledge and translate it into 
their own research capability; and if they continue to work closely with these scientists 
who generate this knowledge, they continue to benefit.  
In addition to increased research output, research collaboration is found to im-
prove the likelihood of procuring funds from both public and private sources. Establish-
ing research collaboration with university scientists conveys to skeptics that a firm has 
research capability at the benchmark level with universities, which offsets any uncer-
tainty about the nanotechnology of the firm or the firm itself. Hence, the fact that the firm 
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is collaborating with universities improves firms’ perceived technology potential and in-
creases its investment opportunities. 
These three types of effects are visible in the data collected for this study. Table 
6.7 provides evidence that firms working with universities have a distinct advantage in 
obtaining patenting, government funding and external investment. In all measurements, 
firms collaborating with universities show better performance than those that do not, and 
the difference is statistically significant. Backing up this finding, this study further inves-
tigates resources owned by each university scientist as a collaborator and breaks down 
these resources into human capital, social capital, and positional capital.  
This investigation found that approximately 750 university scientists have col-
laborated with NNBFs since 1996 and their resources vary in the three dimensions. The 
number of publications produced by these scientists ranges between 1 and 308 (Figure 
5.10) and the mean value of publications per year ranges from 0.1 to 18 (Figure 5.12). 
Each scientist has an average of 17 publications, or 1.68 publications per year. Slightly 
over 100 university scientists have worked in the field of nanotechnology for over 15 
years, while a similar number of scientists are newcomers with fewer than three years of 
experience (Figure 5.11). Some scientists are relatively more collaborative than others. 
The network size of each university scientist varies from 2 to 386 (Figure 5.13). In addi-
tion, these 750 scientists are affiliated with 90 universities, which are ranked differently 
and have diverse reputations (Figure 5.14). Hence, questions arise as to whether scientists 
from high-ranked universities bring different benefits to a firm through collaboration than 
other universities and to what extent and how these benefits differ.  
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Three variables on different dimensions of resources were constructed to examine 
their impact on a firm’s innovative capability, perceived technology and investment po-
tential. In particular, the number of publications per year is used to measure research pro-
ductivity; the number of collaborators is used to indicate network size; and the national 
rank of each university is used as a proxy for university reputation. Regression results of 
econometric models provide a clear picture of the relationship among the variables of 
university scientists’ resources and firm performance (Tables 6.8-6.11).  
 
7.2  A review of the hypotheses 
7.2.1 Hypotheses 1-3: Research productivity 
The first three hypotheses show that firms collaborating with more productive 
university scientists tend to have more innovation output and more government funding 
and external investment opportunities. Only hypothesis 2 is supported. Measured by the 
average number of publications each year, research productivity of university scientists is 
found to help firms procure funding from the government. The scientific quality and sig-
nificance are important criteria when funding agencies evaluate proposals.  The scientific 
knowledge of university scientists contributes by diffusing this knowledge to collabora-
tors and by conveying a sense of the research quality of collaborators. Therefore, firms 
working with highly productive scientists are more likely to have higher research capabil-
ity, which leads to a higher probability of getting funded.  
By contrast, hypothesis 1 is rejected by the regression results. Working with 
highly productive scientists is found to be negatively associated with a firm’s research 
output. This finding can be explained by the construction of these two variables. A scien-
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tist’s productivity is measured by publications while a firm’s research output is measured 
by patents. These two research activities have different research priorities. In fact, they 
are substitutes for each other to some extent. In order to apply for patents, a large part of 
the research cannot be published. Thus, many scientists who are more interested in hold-
ing patents restrain themselves from publishing. Hence, the fact that a university scien-
tist’s publication activities are negatively associated with a firm’s patent activities is not 
inconsistent with the contribution of university scientists’ intellectual capital.  It simply 
shows that publications and patents each represent a distinct focus.  
Hypothesis 3 is also rejected. The research productivity of university scientists 
does not increase the likelihood of venture capital investment in a firm. Venture capital-
ists care about a firm’s technology and innovation capabilities, which are important for a 
firm’s competitiveness in the high tech field.  Thus, they place more attention on a firm’s 
patents, new technologies, and products that can be applied to the market and less on its 
publications, which involve more fundamental and exploratory research. As mentioned 
above, patents and other forms of innovation output come at the cost of publications, 
which explains why firms working with scientists doing more fundamental research are 
less favored by venture capitalists. 
 
7.2.2 Hypotheses 4-6: Network size 
Hypotheses 4 through 6 suggest that the network size of a university scientist has 
a positive impact on the performance of a collaborating firm. Hypotheses 4 and 6, in 
which a university scientist’s social capital is found to be positively associated with a 
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firm’s patents and venture capital investment, are supported. By working with university 
scientists, firms also have access to the networks of these scientists and the resources em-
bedded in the network. The network, mostly composed of weak ties, provides channels 
through which firms are exposed to state-of-the-art knowledge and information. There-
fore, these firms are more likely to be on the right track and have more technology break-
throughs. In addition, scientists with more connections and experience work more active 
in transferring knowledge and are more likely to enhance research and development in 
firms, which reduces any uncertainty about their capability and conveys the development 
potential of the firms to investors.   Thus, the social capital of university scientists, which 
is the indirect social capital of the firm, is valuable to venture capitalists.   
Interestingly, Hypothesis 5, which states that the social capital of university scien-
tists does not help firms get more SBIR/STTR awards, is rejected. Instead, firms working 
with university scientists with less social capital, that is, those with a smaller network size, 
have an advantage when they apply for SBIR/STTR funds. This finding can be attributed 
to the design of the SBIR/STTR programs, whose roles are to help small firms develop in 
their early stages. As most qualifying firms are small and young, in the initial phase of 
their development, they are more likely to be connected with junior or medium-level sci-
entists, who generally have less social capital than senior scientists. Hence, the network 
size of university scientists who collaborate with a firm is negatively correlated with its 
enrollment in the SBIR/STTR programs. 
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7.2.3 Hypotheses 7-9: University reputation 
 This set of hypotheses proposes that the reputation of a university has a positive 
impact on the amount of research output of a partner firm and the number of awarded 
funds and VC investments to the firm. Based on the regression results, these hypotheses 
are neither supported nor rejected. According to the reported statistics, university reputa-
tion produces positive but insignificant coefficients on all four dependent variables, sug-
gesting that firms working with Tier 1 universities in the sample have better performance. 
However, the difference between Tier 1 universities and other universities is not signifi-
cant enough to produce an accurate estimate. That is, from the sample, no conclusions 
can be generalized to the population. 
 
7.2.4 Discussions 
These empirical results show the mix effects of university scientists’ resources on 
firm performance. These results are not completely consistent with findings reported in 
other similar studies. For example, university scientists’ intellectual capital is found to 
have positive impact on partner firms’ performance in terms of granted patents (Zucker 
and Darby 1998) and on investors’ expectation of firms’ value (Darby, Liu et al. 1999), 
while in this thesis, intellectual capital of university scientists is not contributing to firms’ 
performance in any of these two measurements. The difference can be attributed to fol-
lowing reasons.  
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Firstly, in those studies, the level of intellectual capital refers to the ties with star 
scientists and star scientists are identified according to their gene sequence discoveries 
(Zucker, Darby et al. 1994), which represent technological breakthroughs in biotechnol-
ogy. In this thesis, the level of intellectual capital is measured by ties with highly produc-
tive scientists who are identified based on their publication activities. Compared with 
technological breakthroughs, publications are more distant from industrial application. As 
explained in Section 7.2.1, publications and patents represent different research orienta-
tion, while technological breakthroughs can directly lead to patents. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to find scientists with more technological breakthroughs are more able to help 
their collaborators get more patents.   
Secondly, the measurement of intellectual capital is different. In those studies, star 
scientists are defined as those who have at least 41 sequence discoveries, which is a cu-
mulative measurement. This measurement inevitably brings in the effect of other attrib-
utes of scientists. Although not reported in those studies, senior scientists who have 
worked in the field for a long period are more likely to have more discoveries compared 
with new comers. Working experience is in general positively correlated with network 
size. Senior scientists with more discoveries tend to have more contacts in the community 
and have more information channels, which is also valued by investors. In addition, it is 
possible that star scientists are affiliated with prestigious universities and are more likely 
to be trusted by investors. Therefore, intellectual capital is not the only contributing fac-
tor to firms’ performance. Instead, the concept of intellectual capital in Zucker and 
Darby’s series of studies is in fact a mixture with the effect of social capital and position 
capital. By contrast, this study tries to separate different types of capital and test the im-
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pact of each capital individually, which makes the study a good complement to prior 
studies.  
That being said, a caveat in interpreting the results should be mentioned here. Us-
ing different measurements, these studies report almost opposite findings, which shows 
the sensitivity of the results to variable constructions. Therefore, it is suggested to avoid 
over-generalization of these results. For example, the negative coefficient of scientists’ 
intellectual capital on firms’ patents and VC investment does not imply an overall nega-
tive consequence of scientists’ R&D capabilities. It is important to bear in mind that in-
tellectual capital in this context is indicated by scientists’ SCI publications, which has 
rather basic research orientation.    
 
7.3 Significance and implications 
7.3.1 Theoretical implications 
Among the numerous studies on the university-industry relationship, this study is 
the first to apply social capital theory to determine the beneficial effects of this relation-
ship. The concept of network ties is used to show that the university-firm connection and 
the social capital that firms can mobilize through networks can benefit firms. Meanwhile, 
the idea of unequal resource distribution is applied to explain the motivation of selecting 
different research collaboration partners. By employing these concepts, this thesis is able 
to integrate the research on university-industry partnership into the broader picture of so-
cial capital and social network studies. 
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In addition, unlike other studies that consider the human capital of university sci-
entists as the sole contributing factor to the university-firm relationship, this study cate-
gorizes the resources of university scientists into three dimensions:  human capital, social 
capital, and positional capital. Each form of capital and its impact on collaborating firms 
is examined separately. This study found that while the human capital of university scien-
tists indeed contributes to the performance of firms, their social capital is equally impor-
tant. Furthermore, the study suggests that an increase in research capability with the help 
of university scientists is not the only consequence that firms enjoy in research collabora-
tion. More recognition in the scientific community and a strengthening of perceived tech-
nology and investment potential are among the benefits for firms collaborating with uni-
versity scientists. Therefore, this study expands the scope of the analyses of the univer-
sity-industry relationship from a single dimension of resources, intellectual capital, and a 
single dimension of benefits, technology transfer, or knowledge spillover, to multiple di-
mensions of resources and benefits. 
 
7.3.2 Methodological challenges 
This study is faced with several methodological challenges. First of all, as an 
emerging technology, the term “nanotechnology” has no clear definition, nor do the terms 
“nanotechnology firms” or “nanotechnology industry.” In fact, the concepts of nanotech-
nology firms and nanotechnology industry have been the focus of debate in several stud-
ies (Luxresearch 2006). The lack of consensus on a definition for nanotechnology firms 
added to the difficulties with sample selection for this study. Each firm needed to be 
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checked and verified before being selected as an NNBF. In order to reduce the selection 
bias and identify as many firms as possible, the selection started with a large number of 
candidate firms (around 4,000). Thus, not only was the process of selection time-
consuming and tedious, but it also required considerable knowledge of technical terms in 
the review of a firm’s technology and product descriptions. 
The second challenge comes from the large publication dataset. Because the re-
cords of SCI publications obtained from the Web of Science do not reveal authors’ full 
names or their corresponding affiliations, a manual check has to be performed before data 
analysis.  To find the full names and affiliations, the author had to locate the original 
journal article.  However, through this effort, this study assured the accuracy of the name 
of each author and the co-publication tie between each firm and university. 
 
7.3.3 Policy implications 
The finding that collaboration with universities helps firms enhance their research 
capability and development potential supports the widely acknowledged positive role of 
academia in the development of industry. Research partnerships between universities and 
firms not only increase efficiency in knowledge sharing but also provide access to com-
plementary resources. It is especially beneficial to small and young firms since they can 
be supported by university scientists, which certifies their research capabilities. Hence, 
NNBFs can gain from the knowledge that university scientists encouraged to work with 
industry partners will benefit their economic development. Of course, the benefit is mu-
tual, as university scientists who collaborate with firms can explore potential applications 
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of their research and avoid being “the last to recognize what inventions are useful to the 
general public” (Crow and Tucker 2001). Therefore, it is advisable for both firm scien-
tists and university scientists to actively participate in research collaboration. 
In particular, this study proves the importance of the intellectual and social capital 
of university scientists. These resources contribute to a firm’s performance in different 
ways.  In other words, depending on the aim—to hold more patents or to secure govern-
ment funding or venture capital investment—a firm may have different preference in 
choosing partners. Therefore, a match in strength and interests is critical in research col-
laboration.  Some firms may be interested in partnerships with academicians, but they 
may not know which university or scientist best fits their needs, as they may have limited 
knowledge about the university, the scientists, and their research.  Since it is unrealistic 
for firms to maintain up-to-date on such matters, research partnership programs that pro-
vide relevant and easily accessible information are needed to help firms identify the ap-
propriate research partners.  
Serving this function, research partnership programs or intermediary organiza-
tions could publicize government policies regarding small businesses and assist firms 
with securing funding and investment. More importantly, they could facilitate informa-
tion exchange between academia and industry. Firms could learn about current research 
trends in academia and the research interests of university scientists. They could also 
pose research questions and technical problems that academicians might work on. Uni-
versity scientists could also access such programs for interesting research topics and learn 
about market trends. By pooling information from both academia and industry, research 
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partnership programs could reduce transaction costs for both sides when they are seeking 
partners.  
  In addition to the advantage of firms working with certain university scientists in 
firm performance, this study also notes the advantage of firms in certain regions in ob-
taining investment. For example, NNBFs located in California and Massachusetts are 
found to be more favored by venture capitalists due to their proximity to many venture 
capital firms. This poses a challenge for regions without significant venture capital. In 
order to encourage and maintain entrepreneurial activities, these regions need to provide 
incentives to compensate the disadvantage of lacking venture capital. Hence, it is even 
more important for these regions to promote active research partnerships to attract firms.  
Shared research infrastructure could be one of the options. Due to interdiscipli-
nary and complicated nature of nanotech experience, setting up necessary equipments is 
rather expensive to many NNBFs. Providing NNBFs with access to research facilities at a 
low cost or even free will largely alleviate firms’ need for capital in the beginning stages. 
Furthermore, it brings in scientists from different sectors, which naturally creates a net-
work opportunity for them. On the other hand, these regions can provide additional gov-
ernment funding to NNBFs. This fund can be provided either by state government solely 
or by federal agencies and state government jointly. While SBIR/STTR funds support 
R&D activities in the stage of early development for NNBFs, this fund could serve the 
need to support commercialization and marketing technologies developed in the firms, a 
substitute to venture capital. With the availability of R&D infrastructure and additional 
funding opportunities, firms in these regions are not at a too disadvantageous position 
compared with firms in regions with more entrepreneurial resources. 
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7.4 Limitations and future studies 
Similar to other research, this study is not immune to limitations and weaknesses. 
For practical reasons, the measurement of certain variables suffers from validity issues. 
The lack of some data limits the scope of this study. Given these problems, its results 
should be taken more as suggestive rather than definitive. 
 
7.4.1 Measurement validity 
Several measurement limitations of this study need to be recognized. First, the 
number of co-authored publications is used to measure research collaboration between 
firm scientists and university scientists, and research collaboration is used as an indicator 
for network ties between the two. While publications are an important output of scientific 
research, they are not the sole determinants of output. Among other research output are 
patents, new products, and technological improvements. Research collaboration that re-
sulted in these forms could not be captured by the measurement of co-authored publica-
tions.  
Meanwhile, research collaboration is only one of the ways that firms may be con-
nected to universities. Other connections may include the flow of researchers from one 
entity to another, the training or internships of students, the membership of university 
scientists on boards of director or scientific advisory boards, and so forth. These connec-
tions might play similar or different roles in linking firms with university scientists, but 
are not included in this investigation. 
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Another concern is with the measurement of the social capital of university scien-
tists, which is relatively abstract and difficult to quantify. This study uses the number of 
collaborators as a proxy of social capital, but it fails to measure the amount of resources 
that could be mobilized through the network and to distinguish active ties from distant 
ones.  In addition, the number of collaborators, as measured by co-authors in publications, 
did not capture the number of contacts with colleagues and outsiders who may have col-
laborated or exchanged information in other formats.  
 
7.4.2 Data limitation 
This study is restrained by the limitation on data availability. The majority of the 
sample is represented by small private companies whose information is generally not 
publicly available. Therefore, some firm-level information is missing. For example, R&D 
expenditures indicate a firm’s interest and investment in research, which directly affects 
its R&D performance.  
Meanwhile, the number of new products, market share, and sales are stable per-
formance measures that firms are more interested in and concerned about. Exploring the 
impact of collaboration on these measures of their performance may provide a more di-
rect and convincing picture for firms. However, these data are not available in this study. 
 
7.4.3 Future studies 
Future studies need to address the above limitations and improve the model valid-
ity. In particular, the scope of research could be expanded to consider different types of 
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network ties and their density. In addition, more types of firm performance measurements 
could be taken into account.  
In addition, this study could be largely complemented by a qualitative approach. 
Case studies and in-depth interviews with firm employees and university scientists could 
reveal motivations for collaboration and patterns of collaborative interaction, which 
would further the understanding of networking between firms and universities.  
It is also worth mentioning that firms are not the only beneficiaries of university-
industry partnerships. University scientists, free to apply their research in product devel-
opment, are closer to the market and thus the first to learn about the problems of applica-
tions and actual technology needs, which they can turned into new research topics.  Thus, 
a similar study that explores how university scientists benefit from university-industry 
collaboration and from the firms’ resources could be conducted.  In the meantime, while 
this study focuses on the nanotechnology industry, the model and analysis could also be 
applied to other emerging knowledge-intensive industries.  
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APPENDIX A: BEST NATIONAL UNIVERSITIES (TIER 1)  
Table A.1   Best national universities in 1996  
Rank University 
1 Yale University 
2 Princeton University 
3 Harvard University 
4 Duke University 
5 Massachusetts Institute of  Technology 
6 Stanford University 
7 Dartmouth College 
8 Brown University 
9 California Institute of Technology 
9 Northwestern University 
11 Columbia University 
12 University of Chicago 
13 University of Pennsylvania 
14 Cornell University 
15 Johns Hopkins University 
16 Rice University 
17 University of Notre Dame 
17 Washington University 
19 Emory University 
20 Vanderbilt University 
21 University of Virginia 
22 Tufts University 
23 Georgetown University 
24 University of Michigan--Ann Arbor 
25 U. of North Carolina--Chapel Hill 
25 Wake Forest University 
27 University of California--Berkeley 
28 Carnegie Mellon University 
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Table A.1 continued 
29 Brandeis University 
30 University of Rochester 
31 University of California--Los Angeles 
32 Lehigh University 
33 College of William and Mary 
34 University of California--San Diego 
35 New York University 
36 Tulane University 
37 University of California--Irvine 
38 Boston College 
38 Case Western Reserve Univ. 
40 University of California--Davis 
41 University of Wisconsin--Madison 
42 University of Washington 
43 University of Southern California 
44 Syracuse University 
45 Yeshiva University 
46 George Washington University 
46 University of California--Santa Barbara 
48 Georgia Institute of Technology 
48 Texas A&M University--College Station 
50 University of Illinois--Urbana-Champaign 
Source: U.S. News & World Report (1996), Vol. 121 Issue 11, p110. 
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Table A.2   Best national universities in 2000  
Rank University 
1 Princeton University  
2 Harvard University  
2 Yale University  
4 California Institute of Technology  
5 Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
6 Stanford University  
6 University of Pennsylvania 
8 Duke University  
9 Dartmouth College 
10 Columbia University  
10 Cornell University  
10 University of Chicago 
13 Northwestern University  
13 Rice University  
15 Brown University  
15 Johns Hopkins University 
15 Washington University in St. Louis  
18 Emory University  
19 University of Notre Dame 
20 University of California-Berkeley 
20 University of Virginia
22 Vanderbilt University  
23 Carnegie Mellon University  
23 Georgetown University  
25 University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
25 University of California-Los Angeles
25 University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 
28 Wake Forest University  
29 Tufts University  
30 College of William and Mary  
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Table A.2 continued 
31 Brandeis University  
31 University of California-San Diego
33 New York University  
33 University of Rochester 
35 Georgia Institute of Technology 
35 University of Southern California 
35 University of Wisconsin-Madison
38 Boston College 
38 Case Western Reserve University  
38 Lehigh University  
41 University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign
41 University of California-Davis
41 University of California-Irvine
44 Pennsylvania State University-University Park
45 Tulane University  
45 University of California-Santa Barbara
45 University of Washington 
45 Yeshiva University  
49 Pepperdine University  
49 Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. 
49 University of Texas-Austin




Table A.3   Best national universities in 2005  
Rank University 
1 Harvard University  
1 Princeton University  
3 Yale University  
4 University of Pennsylvania 
5 Duke University  
5 Stanford University  
7 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
7 California Institute of Technology  
9 Dartmouth College 
9 Columbia University  
11 Washington University in St Louis 
12 Northwestern University  
13 Cornell University  
13 Johns Hopkins University 
15 Brown University  
15 University of Chicago
17 Rice University  
18 University of Notre Dame 
19 Vanderbilt University  
20 University of California-Berkeley 
20 Emory University  
22 Carnegie Mellon University  
23 University of Virginia
23 Georgetown University  
25 University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 
25 University of California-Los Angeles
27 University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
27 Wake Forest University  
27 Tufts University  
30 University of Southern California
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Table A.3 continued 
31 College of William and Mary  
32 University of California-San Diego
32 Lehigh University  
34 University of Wisconsin-Madison
34 University of Rochester 
34 Brandeis University  
37 Case Western Reserve University 
38 Georgia Institute of Technology 
38 New York University 
40 University of California-Irvine
40 Boston College
42 University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign
43 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
43 Tulane University  
45 University of Washington 
45 University of California-Santa Barbara
45 Yeshiva University  
48 University of California-Davis
48 Pennsylvania State University 
50 University of Florida
50 Syracuse University  




APPENDIX B: STATA OUTPUTS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table B.1   Descriptive statistics at the firm level (N=230) 





ing with universities 
(N=145) 
Variable Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Patent i 
6.409 




(10.237) 0 76 
SBIRfirst i 
1.165 




(1.572) 0 14 
SBIRsecond i 
2.645 




(3.750) 0 34 
VC i 
5.756 




(9.163) 0 68 
Co-publication i 
1.452 


























Note: numbers in parentheses are standard deviation.
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Table B.2   Correlation matrix at the firm level (N=230) 
 patent SBIR1 SBIR2 VC 
Co-
publication productivity network reputation
patent 1   
SBIR1 0.016 1  
SBIR2 0.031 0.900 1  
VC 0.316 -0.062 -0.031 1  
Co-
publication 0.069 0.236 0.225 0.000 1  
productivity 0.081 0.149 0.140 0.003 0.788 1 
network 0.092 0.074 0.083 0.056 0.739 0.930 1















Variable Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max









































































































Note: numbers in parentheses are standard deviation. 
 
 




























tro CA MA 
patent 1   
SBIR1 0.002 1  





0.003 1  
collaboration 0.003 0.178 0.196 0.007 1  
productivity 0.024 0.110 0.116 0.010 0.743 1  
network 0.046 0.058 0.067 0.041 0.684 0.935 1  
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APPENDIX C: STATA OUTPUTS: REGRESSIONS 
Model C.1   The fixed effects OLS model on patents with the variable Cooperation 
. xtreg patent collaboration univspin ownership firmage nanomaterial nanobio-
tech  
nanoelectro CA MA, fe robust 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0116                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0269                                        avg =       6.7 
       overall = 0.0024                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(2,1307)          =      6.90 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2778                        Prob > F           =    0.0010 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      patent |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 collaboration |   .0258509   .0325604     0.79   0.427    -
.0380254    .0897272 
    univspin |  (dropped) 
   ownership |  (dropped) 
     firmage |  -.0987107   .0273196    -3.61   0.000    -.1523057   -.0451157 
nanomaterial |  (dropped) 
 nanobiotech |  (dropped) 
 nanoelectro |  (dropped) 
          CA |  (dropped) 
          MA |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   1.397357   .1715473     8.15   0.000     1.060819    1.733895 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.9589888 
     sigma_e |  2.1783686 




Model C.2   The fixed effects OLS model on patents with variables Productivity, 
Network and Reputation 
. xtreg patent productivity network reputation univspin ownership firmage 
nanomaterial nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA, fe robust 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0142                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0160                                        avg =       6.7 
       overall = 0.0005                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(4,1305)          =      5.48 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2594                        Prob > F           =    0.0002 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      patent |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
productivity |  -.1874726   .1508032    -1.24   0.214    -.4833159    .1083707 
     network |   .2647878   .1652491     1.60   0.109    -.0593951    .5889707 
  reputation |   .0177573   .1028435     0.17   0.863    -.1839993     .219514 
    univspin |  (dropped) 
   ownership |  (dropped) 
     firmage |  -.1025203   .0246732    -4.16   0.000    -.1509238   -.0541169 
nanomaterial |  (dropped) 
 nanobiotech |  (dropped) 
 nanoelectro |  (dropped) 
          CA |  (dropped) 
          MA |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   1.393196    .162489     8.57   0.000     1.074428    1.711964 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.9532774 
     sigma_e |   2.177171 





Model C.3   The fixed effects Poisson model on patents with the variable Collabo-
ration 
. xtpoisson patent collaboration univspin ownership firmage nanomaterial nano-
biotech nanoelectro CA MA, fe 
note: 1 group (1 obs) dropped because of only one obs per group 
note: 114 groups (577 obs) dropped due to all zero outcomes 
note: univspin omitted because it is constant within group 
note: ownership omitted because it is constant within group 
note: nanomaterial omitted because it is constant within group 
note: nanobiotech omitted because it is constant within group 
note: nanoelectro omitted because it is constant within group 
note: CA omitted because it is constant within group 
note: MA omitted because it is constant within group 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -1172.783   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1134.5139   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1134.5098   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1134.5098   
 
Conditional fixed-effects Poisson regression    Number of obs      =       961 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       115 
 
                                                Obs per group: min =         3 
                                                               avg =       8.4 
                                                               max =        10 
 
                                                Wald chi2(2)       =     75.09 
Log likelihood  = -1134.5098                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      patent |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 collaboration |   .0269658   .0167894     1.61   0.108    -
.0059408    .0598724 





Model C.4   The fixed effects Poisson model on patents with variables Productivity, 
Network and Reputation 
. xtpoisson patent productivity network reputation univspin ownership firmage 
nanomaterial nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA, fe 
note: 1 group (1 obs) dropped because of only one obs per group 
note: 114 groups (577 obs) dropped due to all zero outcomes 
note: univspin omitted because it is constant within group 
note: ownership omitted because it is constant within group 
note: nanomaterial omitted because it is constant within group 
note: nanobiotech omitted because it is constant within group 
note: nanoelectro omitted because it is constant within group 
note: CA omitted because it is constant within group 
note: MA omitted because it is constant within group 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -1172.783   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1124.7133   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1124.5125   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1124.5125   
 
Conditional fixed-effects Poisson regression    Number of obs      =       961 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       115 
 
                                                Obs per group: min =         3 
                                                               avg =       8.4 
                                                               max =        10 
 
                                                Wald chi2(4)       =     92.50 
Log likelihood  = -1124.5125                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      patent |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
productivity |  -.2989772    .092203    -3.24   0.001    -.4796918   -.1182625 
     network |   .3020516   .0876813     3.44   0.001     .1301993    .4739039 
  reputation |   .0941275   .0861351     1.09   0.274    -.0746942    .2629492 




Model C.5   The fixed effects negative binomial model on patents with the variable 
Collaboration 
. xtnbreg patent collaboration univspin ownership firmage nanomaterial nano-
biotec 
> h nanoelectro CA MA, fe 
note: 1 group (1 obs) dropped because of only one obs per group 
note: 114 groups (577 obs) dropped due to all zero outcomes 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -928.56765   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -909.24719   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -902.90283   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -902.83549   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -902.83548   
 
Conditional FE negative binomial regression     Number of obs      =       961 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       115 
 
                                                Obs per group: min =         3 
                                                               avg =       8.4 
                                                               max =        10 
 
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =     16.27 
Log likelihood  = -902.83548                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0615 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      patent |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 collaboration |   .0012146    .024597     0.05   0.961    -
.0469947    .0494238 
    univspin |  -.6461938   .2730086    -2.37   0.018    -1.181281   -.1111068 
   ownership |  -.1264386   .3725311    -0.34   0.734    -.8565861    .6037089 
     firmage |  -.0523604   .0166711    -3.14   0.002     -.085035   -.0196857 
nanomaterial |   .7225901   .3882791     1.86   0.063     -.038423    1.483603 
 nanobiotech |   .7994722   .4147545     1.93   0.054    -.0134316    1.612376 
 nanoelectro |   .4624155   .3945798     1.17   0.241    -.3109466    1.235778 
          CA |  -.2133345   .3036253    -0.70   0.482    -.8084292    .3817602 
          MA |    .380503   .3459834     1.10   0.271     -.297612    1.058618 




Model C.6   The fixed effects negative binomial model on patents with variables 
Productivity, Network and Reputation 
. xtnbreg patent productivity network reputation univspin ownership firmage 
nan 
> omaterial nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA, fe 
note: 1 group (1 obs) dropped because of only one obs per group 
note: 114 groups (577 obs) dropped due to all zero outcomes 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -923.9769   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -905.24891   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -898.65039   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -898.58062   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -898.58061   
 
Conditional FE negative binomial regression     Number of obs      =       961 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       115 
 
                                                Obs per group: min =         3 
                                                               avg =       8.4 
                                                               max =        10 
 
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =     24.83 
Log likelihood  = -898.58061                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0097 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      patent |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
productivity |  -.2363398   .1233787    -1.92   0.055    -.4781575     .005478 
     network |   .2839773   .1130466     2.51   0.012     .0624101    .5055445 
  reputation |  -.0453216   .1290409    -0.35   0.725    -.2982371    .2075938 
    univspin |  -.6202927   .2768834    -2.24   0.025    -1.162974   -.0776111 
   ownership |  -.1390341   .3772901    -0.37   0.712    -.8785091    .6004409 
     firmage |  -.0588051   .0161427    -3.64   0.000    -.0904442   -.0271659 
nanomaterial |   .7670627   .4055921     1.89   0.059    -.0278833    1.562009 
 nanobiotech |   .9342101   .4277202     2.18   0.029     .0958938    1.772526 
 nanoelectro |   .5436486   .4110001     1.32   0.186    -.2618968    1.349194 
          CA |  -.1806518   .3113805    -0.58   0.562    -.7909464    .4296428 
          MA |   .3223334   .3449752     0.93   0.350    -.3538055    .9984724 





Model C.7   The zero-inflated Poisson model on patents with the variable Collabo-
ration 
. zip patent collaboration univspin ownership firmage nanomaterial nanobiotech 
nanoelectro CA MA y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005, in-
flate(collaboration univspin ownership firmage nanomaterial nanobiotech nanoe-
lectro CA MA  y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005) vuong 
 
Fitting constant-only model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -2684.2788   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2092.839   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2015.1051   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2008.8937   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2008.8235   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -2008.8234   
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -2008.8234   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1741.1764   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1698.8848   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1697.2196   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1697.1975   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1697.1975   
 
Zero-inflated Poisson regression                  Number of obs   =       1539 
                                                  Nonzero obs     =        396 
                                                  Zero obs        =       1143 
 
Inflation model = logit                           LR chi2(18)     =     623.25 
Log likelihood  = -1697.198                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
patent       | 
 collaboration |   .0275595   .0198053     1.39   0.164    -
.0112582    .0663773 
    univspin |  -.1819302   .0802717    -2.27   0.023    -.3392598   -.0246006 
   ownership |  -.8934932   .0819201   -10.91   0.000    -1.054054   -.7329327 
     firmage |  -.0510143   .0088035    -5.79   0.000    -.0682687   -.0337598 
nanomaterial |  -.3059538   .1164784    -2.63   0.009    -.5342473   -.0776603 
 nanobiotech |   .6581282   .1188192     5.54   0.000     .4252468    .8910095 
 nanoelectro |   -.289899   .1207605    -2.40   0.016    -.5265852   -.0532128 
          CA |   .5344035   .0814115     6.56   0.000     .3748399    .6939671 
          MA |    .184448   .1047843     1.76   0.078    -.0209254    .3898214 
       y1997 |   .7236744   .1792187     4.04   0.000     .3724121    1.074937 
       y1998 |   .4456325   .1834646     2.43   0.015     .0860485    .8052164 
       y1999 |   .5866728   .1768688     3.32   0.001     .2400164    .9333292 
       y2000 |   .7151383   .1691857     4.23   0.000     .3835405    1.046736 
       y2001 |   .8159191   .1642851     4.97   0.000     .4939263    1.137912 
       y2002 |   .8631587   .1654221     5.22   0.000     .5389373     1.18738 
       y2003 |   .3547916   .1806509     1.96   0.050     .0007224    .7088607 
       y2004 |   .1643393   .2063321     0.80   0.426    -.2400641    .5687427 
       y2005 |  -.7873672   .4911807    -1.60   0.109    -1.750064    .1753292 
       _cons |   1.443697   .1852479     7.79   0.000     1.080618    1.806776 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate      | 
 collaboration |  -.0928096   .0475848    -1.95   0.051    -
.1860741    .0004549 
    univspin |  -.0852025   .1595072    -0.53   0.593    -.3978308    .2274258 
   ownership |   .2383186   .3181286     0.75   0.454    -.3852021    .8618393 
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Model C.7 continued      
 
     firmage |  -.1593689   .0227371    -7.01   0.000    -.2039329   -.1148049 
nanomaterial |   .7581703   .2900759     2.61   0.009     .1896319    1.326709 
 nanobiotech |   1.215096   .3128127     3.88   0.000     .6019942    1.828197 
 nanoelectro |   .8113335   .2953276     2.75   0.006     .2325019    1.390165 
          CA |  -.4459959   .1815543    -2.46   0.014    -.8018357   -.0901561 
          MA |  -.6866877     .24259    -2.83   0.005    -1.162155   -.2112201 
       y1997 |     1.1936   .4570602     2.61   0.009     .2977783    2.089421 
       y1998 |   .8891141   .4436988     2.00   0.045     .0194805    1.758748 
       y1999 |   .9611674   .4327944     2.22   0.026     .1129059    1.809429 
       y2000 |   1.007909   .4182936     2.41   0.016     .1880685    1.827749 
       y2001 |   .9730518   .4091903     2.38   0.017     .1710535     1.77505 
       y2002 |   1.274293   .4095427     3.11   0.002     .4716037    2.076981 
       y2003 |   1.204359   .4172869     2.89   0.004     .3864922    2.022227 
       y2004 |   2.168859   .4416639     4.91   0.000     1.303214    3.034504 
       y2005 |   3.533004   .6976458     5.06   0.000     2.165643    4.900365 
       _cons |  -.3826371   .5142725    -0.74   0.457    -1.390593    .6253185 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




Model C.8   The zero-inflated Poisson model on patents with variables Productivity, 
Network and Reputation 
. zip patent productivity network reputation univspin ownership firmage nano-
material nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA  y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 
y2003 y2004 y2005, inflate(productivity network reputation univspin ownership 
firmage nanomaterial nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA  y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 
y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005) vuong 
 
Fitting constant-only model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -2684.2788   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2090.6288   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2018.3875   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1997.1009   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1996.3082   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1996.3052   
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -1996.3052   
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1996.3052   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1722.0486   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1671.1303   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1669.3057   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1669.2933   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1669.2933   
 
Zero-inflated Poisson regression                  Number of obs   =       1539 
                                                  Nonzero obs     =        396 
                                                  Zero obs        =       1143 
 
Inflation model = logit                           LR chi2(20)     =     654.02 
Log likelihood  = -1669.293                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
patent       | 
productivity |  -.2393871   .0788995    -3.03   0.002    -.3940273    -.084747 
     network |   .1424327   .0672738     2.12   0.034     .0105785    .2742869 
  reputation |   .3076942   .0627432     4.90   0.000     .1847197    .4306687 
    univspin |  -.1733031   .0817216    -2.12   0.034    -.3334745   -.0131317 
   ownership |  -.9511395   .0825713   -11.52   0.000    -1.112976   -.7893027 
     firmage |  -.0500747   .0082217    -6.09   0.000     -.066189   -.0339604 
nanomaterial |   .0130978   .1328996     0.10   0.921    -.2473806    .2735763 
 nanobiotech |   .9144061   .1316659     6.94   0.000     .6563457    1.172466 
 nanoelectro |  -.0440383   .1328925    -0.33   0.740    -.3045028    .2164262 
          CA |   .5657853   .0835934     6.77   0.000     .4019453    .7296253 
          MA |   .2733941   .1031539     2.65   0.008     .0712162     .475572 
       y1997 |   .7338957   .1789842     4.10   0.000      .383093    1.084698 
       y1998 |   .4607993   .1831989     2.52   0.012      .101736    .8198625 
       y1999 |   .6172417   .1766876     3.49   0.000     .2709404    .9635429 
       y2000 |   .7022291   .1692492     4.15   0.000     .3705067    1.033952 
       y2001 |   .8027634   .1646968     4.87   0.000     .4799636    1.125563 
       y2002 |   .9011274   .1655274     5.44   0.000     .5766996    1.225555 
       y2003 |   .3474891    .180503     1.93   0.054    -.0062903    .7012685 
       y2004 |   .0927922   .2068221     0.45   0.654    -.3125717    .4981561 
       y2005 |  -.5171231   .4587178    -1.13   0.260    -1.416193    .3819473 
       _cons |    1.17143   .1960999     5.97   0.000     .7870816    1.555779 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate      | 
productivity |   .3278215   .2363042     1.39   0.165    -.1353263    .7909693 
     network |  -.6792876   .2284801    -2.97   0.003      -1.1271   -.2314748 
  reputation |   .2284186   .1398933     1.63   0.103    -.0457673    .5026045 
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Model C.8 continued 
 
    univspin |  -.1084389   .1622716    -0.67   0.504    -.4264855    .2096077 
   ownership |   .1014068   .3126391     0.32   0.746    -.5113545    .7141681 
     firmage |  -.1519404   .0210215    -7.23   0.000    -.1931417   -.1107391 
nanomaterial |   .7056585   .3169175     2.23   0.026     .0845117    1.326805 
 nanobiotech |   1.092649   .3365094     3.25   0.001     .4331026    1.752195 
 nanoelectro |   .7298644   .3217065     2.27   0.023     .0993313    1.360397 
          CA |  -.4603532   .1844262    -2.50   0.013     -.821822   -.0988844 
          MA |  -.5982356   .2317321    -2.58   0.010    -1.052422    -.144049 
       y1997 |   1.178033   .4600554     2.56   0.010     .2763412    2.079725 
       y1998 |   .9033897   .4473674     2.02   0.043     .0265657    1.780214 
       y1999 |   .9905878   .4357942     2.27   0.023      .136447    1.844729 
       y2000 |   1.005153   .4223963     2.38   0.017     .1772714    1.833034 
       y2001 |   .9533491   .4136774     2.30   0.021     .1425564    1.764142 
       y2002 |   1.313144   .4140636     3.17   0.002     .5015946    2.124694 
       y2003 |   1.205542   .4226005     2.85   0.004     .3772607    2.033824 
       y2004 |    2.11061   .4504887     4.69   0.000     1.227668    2.993551 
       y2005 |   3.880729   .6730825     5.77   0.000     2.561512    5.199946 
       _cons |  -.1804494   .5337804    -0.34   0.735     -1.22664     .865741 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Vuong test of zip vs. standard Poisson:            z =     7.19  Pr>z = 0.0000 
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Model C.9   The fixed effects OLS model on SBIRfirst with the variable Collabora-
tion 
. xtreg SBIRfirst collaboration univspin ownership firmage nanomaterial nano-
biotech nanoelectro CA MA, fe robust 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0379                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0802                                        avg =       6.7 
       overall = 0.0578                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(2,1307)          =     14.33 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0502                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   SBIRfirst |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 collaboration |   .0136458   .0041339     3.30   
0.001      .005536    .0217556 
    univspin |  (dropped) 
   ownership |  (dropped) 
     firmage |   .0062813   .0022276     2.82   0.005     .0019112    .0106513 
nanomaterial |  (dropped) 
 nanobiotech |  (dropped) 
 nanoelectro |  (dropped) 
          CA |  (dropped) 
          MA |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   .0470275   .0133309     3.53   0.000     .0208752    .0731799 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .14913129 
     sigma_e |  .16303676 




Model C.10   The fixed effects OLS model on SBIRfirst with variables Productivity, 
Network and Reputation 
. xtreg SBIRfirst productivity network reputation univspin ownership firmage 
nanomaterial nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA, fe robust 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0381                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0793                                        avg =       6.7 
       overall = 0.0608                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(4,1305)          =      7.91 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0540                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   SBIRfirst |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
productivity |   .0515023   .0153402     3.36   0.001     .0214082    .0815965 
     network |  -.0422471   .0138926    -3.04   0.002    -.0695014   -.0149927 
  reputation |    .009135   .0112385     0.81   0.416    -.0129124    .0311825 
    univspin |  (dropped) 
   ownership |  (dropped) 
     firmage |   .0078265   .0021411     3.66   0.000     .0036261     .012027 
nanomaterial |  (dropped) 
 nanobiotech |  (dropped) 
 nanoelectro |  (dropped) 
          CA |  (dropped) 
          MA |  (dropped) 
       _cons |    .042712   .0131542     3.25   0.001     .0169062    .0685178 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .14909799 
     sigma_e |   .1631393 




Model C.11   The Tobit model on SBIRfirst with the variable Collaboration 
. xttobit SBIRfirst collaboration univspin ownership firmage nanomaterial 
nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA 
 
Obtaining starting values for full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  419.40731 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =   421.3398 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  421.42413 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  421.42426 
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  421.42426   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  421.42426   
 
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.7 
                                                               max =        10 
 
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =     79.90 
Log likelihood  =  421.42426                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   SBIRfirst |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 collaboration |    .013992   .0027411     5.10   
0.000     .0086196    .0193644 
    univspin |  -.0224432   .0215609    -1.04   0.298    -.0647018    .0198153 
   ownership |    .095094   .0523219     1.82   0.069    -.0074551     .197643 
     firmage |   .0067418   .0016212     4.16   0.000     .0035643    .0099192 
nanomaterial |     .02576   .0428015     0.60   0.547    -.0581293    .1096493 
 nanobiotech |   .0558255   .0453942     1.23   0.219    -.0331456    .1447965 
 nanoelectro |   .0264526   .0437278     0.60   0.545    -.0592524    .1121576 
          CA |   -.042763    .027268    -1.57   0.117    -.0962074    .0106814 
          MA |   .0367395   .0331224     1.11   0.267    -.0281792    .1016582 
       _cons |  -.0637682   .0616418    -1.03   0.301    -.1845839    .0570474 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /sigma_u |    .137776    .007599    18.13   0.000     .1228823    .1526697 
    /sigma_e |   .1621101   .0031398    51.63   0.000     .1559562     .168264 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .4193863   .0288377                      .3638813    .4765461 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  Observation summary:         0  left-censored observations 
                            1539     uncensored observations 
                               0 right-censored observations 
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Model C.12   The Tobit model on SBIRfirst with variables Productivity, Network 
and Reputation 
. xttobit SBIRfirst productivity network reputation univspin ownership firmage  
nanomaterial nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA 
 
Obtaining starting values for full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  417.24107 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  421.48427 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  421.58447 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  421.58461 
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  421.58461   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  421.58461   
 
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.7 
                                                               max =        10 
 
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =     80.28 
Log likelihood  =  421.58461                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   SBIRfirst |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
productivity |   .0550824   .0115137     4.78   0.000      .032516    .0776488 
     network |  -.0441913   .0116661    -3.79   0.000    -.0670564   -.0213263 
  reputation |   .0033897   .0103497     0.33   0.743    -.0168952    .0236747 
    univspin |  -.0202122   .0215451    -0.94   0.348    -.0624398    .0220154 
   ownership |   .0946341   .0522914     1.81   0.070    -.0078551    .1971233 
     firmage |   .0083562   .0015897     5.26   0.000     .0052406    .0114719 
nanomaterial |   .0197942   .0429323     0.46   0.645    -.0643515      .10394 
 nanobiotech |   .0465438   .0455319     1.02   0.307    -.0426971    .1357848 
 nanoelectro |   .0212634   .0438262     0.49   0.628    -.0646343    .1071612 
          CA |   -.044623    .027258    -1.64   0.102    -.0980478    .0088017 
          MA |   .0314678   .0330816     0.95   0.341    -.0333709    .0963066 
       _cons |  -.0615676   .0616663    -1.00   0.318    -.1824312    .0592961 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /sigma_u |   .1376125   .0076084    18.09   0.000     .1227003    .1525247 
    /sigma_e |   .1621171   .0031409    51.62   0.000     .1559612    .1682731 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |    .418787   .0289028                      .3631658    .4760834 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  Observation summary:         0  left-censored observations 
                            1539     uncensored observations 
                               0 right-censored observations 
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Model C.13   The fixed effects OLS model on SBIRsecond with the variable Col-
laboration 
. xtreg SBIRsecond SBIRfirst collaboration univspin ownership firmage nanoma-
terial nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA, fe robust 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1310                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.6336                                        avg =       6.7 
       overall = 0.3964                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(3,1306)          =     17.44 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4609                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  SBIRsecond |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   SBIRfirst |   .8743527   .1870884     4.67   0.000     .5073261    1.241379 
 collaboration |   .0257833   .0107814     2.39   
0.017     .0046326     .046934 
    univspin |  (dropped) 
   ownership |  (dropped) 
     firmage |   .0221112   .0057593     3.84   0.000     .0108128    .0334097 
nanomaterial |  (dropped) 
 nanobiotech |  (dropped) 
 nanoelectro |  (dropped) 
          CA |  (dropped) 
          MA |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -.0178638   .0368045    -0.49   0.627    -.0900662    .0543387 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   .3425567 
     sigma_e |  .46513597 





Model C.14   The fixed effects OLS model on SBIRsecond with variables Produc-
tivity, Network and Reputation 
. xtreg SBIRsecond SBIRfirst productivity network reputation univspin owner-
ship firmage nanomaterial nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA, fe robust 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1295                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.6136                                        avg =       6.7 
       overall = 0.3895                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(5,1304)          =     11.03 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4418                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  SBIRsecond |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   SBIRfirst |   .8790729   .1860962     4.72   0.000     .5139921    1.244154 
productivity |   .0861252    .044868     1.92   0.055    -.0018961    .1741466 
     network |  -.0812655   .0459147    -1.77   0.077    -.1713402    .0088093 
  reputation |   .0249885   .0358702     0.70   0.486    -.0453811    .0953581 
    univspin |  (dropped) 
   ownership |  (dropped) 
     firmage |    .026227   .0059587     4.40   0.000     .0145374    .0379166 
nanomaterial |  (dropped) 
 nanobiotech |  (dropped) 
 nanoelectro |  (dropped) 
          CA |  (dropped) 
          MA |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -.0299376   .0367746    -0.81   0.416    -.1020815    .0422063 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .34355805 
     sigma_e |  .46590542 





Model C.15   The Tobit model on SBIRsecond with the variable Collaboration 
. xttobit SBIRsecond SBIRfirst collaboration univspin ownership firmage nano-
material nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA 
 
Obtaining starting values for full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1159.3184 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1131.9661 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1130.9306 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1130.9265 
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1130.9265   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1130.9265   
 
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.7 
                                                               max =        10 
 
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =    426.93 
Log likelihood  = -1130.9265                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  SBIRsecond |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   SBIRfirst |    1.28985   .0782799    16.48   0.000     1.136424    1.443275 
 collaboration |   .0258536   .0074025     3.49   
0.000     .0113449    .0403623 
    univspin |   -.085559   .0459269    -1.86   0.062    -.1755741     .004456 
   ownership |   .1606443   .1084666     1.48   0.139    -.0519463     .373235 
     firmage |   .0175345   .0041684     4.21   0.000     .0093645    .0257045 
nanomaterial |   .1194614   .0914884     1.31   0.192    -.0598526    .2987754 
 nanobiotech |   .0709415   .0972823     0.73   0.466    -.1197283    .2616113 
 nanoelectro |   .0487604   .0933555     0.52   0.601     -.134213    .2317339 
          CA |  -.0299759   .0577792    -0.52   0.604     -.143221    .0832692 
          MA |   .1717178   .0699084     2.46   0.014     .0346999    .3087357 
       _cons |  -.2342322   .1305532    -1.79   0.073    -.4901118    .0216473 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /sigma_u |   .2619851   .0190863    13.73   0.000     .2245767    .2993936 
    /sigma_e |   .4648608   .0090907    51.14   0.000     .4470433    .4826784 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .2410556   .0286033                      .1886678    .3004851 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  Observation summary:         0  left-censored observations 
                            1539     uncensored observations 




Model C.16   The Tobit model on SBIRsecond with variables Productivity, Network 
and Reputation 
. xttobit SBIRsecond SBIRfirst productivity network reputation univspin owner-
ship firmage nanomaterial nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA 
 
Obtaining starting values for full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1161.4414 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1134.0325 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1132.9837 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1132.9796 
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1132.9796   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1132.9796   
 
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.7 
                                                               max =        10 
 
                                                Wald chi2(12)      =    423.25 
Log likelihood  = -1132.9796                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  SBIRsecond |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   SBIRfirst |   1.294451   .0783681    16.52   0.000     1.140852     1.44805 
productivity |   .0854368    .031209     2.74   0.006     .0242683    .1466053 
     network |  -.0713061   .0312684    -2.28   0.023     -.132591   -.0100213 
  reputation |   .0050285   .0282652     0.18   0.859    -.0503704    .0604273 
    univspin |  -.0808805   .0460556    -1.76   0.079    -.1711479    .0093869 
   ownership |   .1609769   .1088606     1.48   0.139    -.0523859    .3743398 
     firmage |   .0208706   .0041308     5.05   0.000     .0127743    .0289669 
nanomaterial |   .1052386    .092375     1.14   0.255    -.0758132    .2862903 
 nanobiotech |   .0475881   .0981929     0.48   0.628    -.1448665    .2400427 
 nanoelectro |   .0359598   .0941242     0.38   0.702    -.1485203    .2204399 
          CA |  -.0338905   .0579868    -0.58   0.559    -.1475425    .0797614 
          MA |   .1601591   .0700454     2.29   0.022     .0228727    .2974455 
       _cons |  -.2277649   .1313366    -1.73   0.083    -.4851799    .0296501 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /sigma_u |   .2628491    .019167    13.71   0.000     .2252824    .3004158 
    /sigma_e |   .4653833   .0091045    51.12   0.000     .4475388    .4832278 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .2418502   .0287003                       .189279    .3014723 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  Observation summary:         0  left-censored observations 
                            1539     uncensored observations 




Model C.17   The fixed effects OLS model on VC with the variable Collaboration 
. xtreg vc collaboration univspin ownership firmage nanomaterial nanobiotech 
nanoelectro CA MA, fe robust 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0045                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0126                                        avg =       6.7 
       overall = 0.0029                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(2,1307)          =      3.90 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2537                        Prob > F           =    0.0204 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
          vc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 collaboration |   .0191174   .0294171     0.65   0.516    -
.0385925    .0768274 
    univspin |  (dropped) 
   ownership |  (dropped) 
     firmage |   .0793467   .0365521     2.17   0.030     .0076394    .1510539 
nanomaterial |  (dropped) 
 nanobiotech |  (dropped) 
 nanoelectro |  (dropped) 
          CA |  (dropped) 
          MA |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   .3521066   .2152718     1.64   0.102    -.0702094    .7744226 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.4929748 
     sigma_e |   3.197349 





Model C.18   The fixed effects OLS model on VC with variables Productivity, Net-
work and Reputation 
. xtreg vc productivity network reputation univspin ownership firmage nanoma-
terial nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA, fe robust 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0080                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0002                                        avg =       6.7 
       overall = 0.0000                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(4,1305)          =      2.14 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2176                        Prob > F           =    0.0732 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
          vc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
productivity |  -.5258599   .2371129    -2.22   0.027     -.991024   -.0606958 
     network |   .5142811   .2716977     1.89   0.059     -.018731    1.047293 
  reputation |   .0300926   .1715084     0.18   0.861    -.3063696    .3665549 
    univspin |  (dropped) 
   ownership |  (dropped) 
     firmage |   .0864867    .035721     2.42   0.016     .0164097    .1565636 
nanomaterial |  (dropped) 
 nanobiotech |  (dropped) 
 nanoelectro |  (dropped) 
          CA |  (dropped) 
          MA |  (dropped) 
       _cons |    .301184   .2126781     1.42   0.157    -.1160444    .7184123 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.4771937 
     sigma_e |  3.1941971 





Model C.19   The Tobit model on VC with the variable Collaboration 
. xttobit vc collaboration univspin ownership firmage nanomaterial nanobiotech 
nanoelectro CA MA 
 
Obtaining starting values for full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -4108.3419 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -4106.717 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -4106.7086 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -4106.7086 
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -4106.7148   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -4106.7148   
 
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.7 
                                                               max =        10 
 
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =     23.11 
Log likelihood  = -4106.7148                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0060 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          vc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 collaboration |   .0441125   .0509175     0.87   0.386    -
.0556839    .1439089 
    univspin |    .880833   .3245607     2.71   0.007     .2447056     1.51696 
   ownership |   .2514161   .7678568     0.33   0.743    -1.253556    1.756388 
     firmage |   .0269381   .0289453     0.93   0.352    -.0297937      .08367 
nanomaterial |  -1.212668   .6466896    -1.88   0.061    -2.480157    .0548199 
 nanobiotech |  -1.238568   .6867684    -1.80   0.071    -2.584609    .1074733 
 nanoelectro |  -1.315295   .6599274    -1.99   0.046    -2.608729   -.0218608 
          CA |   1.276891   .4082312     3.13   0.002     .4767729     2.07701 
          MA |     .91663   .4945164     1.85   0.064    -.0526044    1.885864 
       _cons |   .8420844     .92432     0.91   0.362    -.9695495    2.653718 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /sigma_u |    1.87866   .1359599    13.82   0.000     1.612183    2.145136 
    /sigma_e |   3.201277   .0628267    50.95   0.000     3.078139    3.324415 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .2561678   .0296752                      .2016049     .317569 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  Observation summary:         0  left-censored observations 
                            1539     uncensored observations 




Model C.20   The Tobit model on VC with variables Productivity, Network and 
Reputation 
. xttobit vc productivity network reputation univspin ownership firmage nano-
material nanobiotech nanoelectro CA MA 
 
Obtaining starting values for full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -4103.7658 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -4101.8166 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -4101.8071 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -4101.8071 
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -4101.8126   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -4101.8126   
 
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs      =      1539 
Group variable (i): ID                          Number of groups   =       230 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.7 
                                                               max =        10 
 
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =     33.55 
Log likelihood  = -4101.8126                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0004 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          vc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
productivity |   -.602959   .2134389    -2.82   0.005    -1.021292   -.1846265 
     network |   .6083808   .2145461     2.84   0.005     .1878782    1.028883 
  reputation |    .157904   .1947204     0.81   0.417    -.2237408    .5395489 
    univspin |   .8897504   .3205087     2.78   0.006     .2615648    1.517936 
   ownership |   .3084648   .7575837     0.41   0.684    -1.176372    1.793302 
     firmage |    .025416   .0283518     0.90   0.370    -.0301525    .0809844 
nanomaterial |  -1.053066   .6428406    -1.64   0.101    -2.313011    .2068781 
 nanobiotech |  -1.087552   .6828564    -1.59   0.111    -2.425926    .2508217 
 nanoelectro |  -1.170365   .6550633    -1.79   0.074    -2.454266     .113535 
          CA |    1.30346   .4032412     3.23   0.001     .5131213    2.093798 
          MA |   .9275346   .4877608     1.90   0.057     -.028459    1.883528 
       _cons |   .6198674   .9148864     0.68   0.498    -1.173277    2.413012 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /sigma_u |   1.843684   .1351165    13.65   0.000      1.57886    2.108507 
    /sigma_e |   3.196592   .0627461    50.94   0.000     3.073612    3.319572 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .2496201   .0295281                      .1954588    .3108589 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  Observation summary:         0  left-censored observations 
                            1539     uncensored observations 
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